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ARTICLES

WHITE COLLAR CRIME'S GRAY AREA: THE ANOMALY OF
CRIMINALIZING CONDUCT NOT CIVILLY ACTIONABLE
Wendy Gerwick Couture*
ABSTRACT

Substantive and procedural differences between criminal and civil
treatment of conduct sounding in securities fraud combine to cause
the following anomaly: certain false statements to investors may be
actionable
criminally-subjecting
individual
defendants
to
imprisonment-but not civilly-leaving victims without remedy.
The imposition of criminal punishment for conduct that does not
invoke civil liability risks disrupting the current scheme of
securities regulation, at the expense of considerations deemed
important by Congress and the courts. Moreover, the extension of
criminal liability beyond the scope of civil liability debunks the
assumption, which underlies the current scholarship on the civilcriminal divide, that criminal liability is a subset of civil liability in
circumstances where the relevant conduct injures identifiable
individuals. This article demonstrates that criminal liability is
more expansive than civil liability in the context of securities fraud,
analyzes the impact of this anomaly on the current scheme of
securities regulation, and considers whether the rationales
underlying the leading theories of the civil-criminal divide explain
this unique liability configuration. This article concludes that,
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although this configuration has destabilizing effects, it is arguably
consistent with many of the theories underlying the civil-criminal
divide. Therefore, this article proposes a two-step solution to
further the rationales of the civil-criminal divide while preserving
the delicate balance of the current scheme of securities regulation.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Substantive and procedural differences between criminal and civil
treatment of conduct sounding in securities fraud combine to cause
the following anomaly: certain false statements to investors may be
actionable
criminally-subjecting
individual
defendants
to
imprisonment-but not civilly-leaving victims without remedy.
This article examines five of these differences, demonstrates how
they combine to cause this anomalous civil and criminal treatment
of conduct sounding in securities fraud, analyzes the impact of this
anomaly on the current scheme of securities regulation, and
considers whether the rationales underlying the leading theories of
the civil-criminal divide explain the anomaly.
Part II of this article demonstrates that discrepancies between
criminal and civil liability for securities fraud result in the
criminalization of conduct not civilly actionable. First, the elements
of the federal crime are often broader than the elements of the civil
cause of action.
In federal criminal prosecutions for conduct
sounding in securities fraud, a lower materiality standard often
applies than in civil cases, forward-looking statements are not
protected by the "safe harbor" that is often invoked in civil cases,
and liability is not confined to primary violators as in private civil
actions. Moreover, at the state level, broad blue-sky laws and
federal preemption of state civil securities class actions combine to
criminalize conduct that is not civilly actionable. Finally, courts do
not subject criminal indictments to the same level of pretrial
scrutiny as civil complaints, and motions to dismiss are less favored
in criminal cases than in civil cases.
Part III of this article shows that the imposition of criminal
punishment for conduct not civilly actionable risks disrupting the
current scheme of securities regulation, at the expense of
considerations deemed important by Congress and the courts. The
lower materiality standard and the unavailability of the safe harbor
in criminal cases may chill corporate disclosure and may affect what
information reasonable investors rely upon when making
investment decisions. In addition, the potential of criminal aiding
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and abetting liability may discourage secondary actors from
advising less established companies. Further, the broader criminal
statutes may shift enforcement responsibility away from the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to the Department of
Justice and to the states. Moreover, the criminalization of wide
swathes of corporate conduct affords prosecutors broad discretion to
decide whom to prosecute, invoking concerns about selective
prosecution and separation of powers, and affords the SEC
remarkable leverage in negotiating civil settlements. Finally, the
narrow scope of private civil liability leaves injured investors
without remedy.
Part IV of this article examines whether any of the dominant
theories about the civil-criminal divide explains the anomalous
relationship between civil and criminal liability in the context of
securities fraud. The extension of criminal liability beyond the
scope of civil liability debunks the assumption underlying the
current scholarship on the civil-criminal divide that criminal
liability is a subset of civil liability, but an examination of the
rationales behind the leading theories of the civil-criminal divide
lends some support for this unique configuration of liability in the
context of securities fraud.
Finally, Part V of this article proposes a two-step solution. First,
in light of the wide-ranging consequences of imposing criminal
liability for conduct that does not incur civil securities fraud
liability, Congress should reign in the scope of criminal liability to
the current reach of private civil liability for conduct sounding in
securities fraud. Second, because the more expansive reach of
criminal liability is arguably consistent with many of the theories
underlying the civil-criminal divide, Congress should consider
carefully whether to expand the reach of criminal liability-while
recognizing and compensating for the impacts of that expansion on
the carefully balanced scheme of securities regulation.
II. CONDUCT THAT Is NOT ACTIONABLE AS CIVIL SECURITIES FRAUD
MAY BE CRIMINALLY PROSECUTED.
Five major differences between criminal and civil treatment of
conduct sounding in securities fraud create an anomaly in which
conduct not actionable as securities fraud may nonetheless be
criminally prosecuted. First, prosecutors may use the criminal wire
and mail fraud statutes, which have no civil equivalent, to prosecute
conduct that does not violate the securities fraud statute ("the
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wire/mail fraud run-around"). Second, an individual defendant may
be held criminally, but not civilly, liable for allegedly false forwardlooking statements accompanied by meaningful cautionary
language.
Third, an individual defendant may be criminally
prosecuted for aiding and abetting securities fraud, but an investor
injured by the defendant's conduct is barred from asserting a
private right of action. Fourth, some state blue-sky laws impose
criminal liability for conduct that is not civilly actionable as
securities fraud. Fifth, courts do not subject criminal indictments
for securities fraud to the same degree of pretrial scrutiny as civil
securities fraud complaints, leaving more issues to the jury. As
shown below, these differences allow conduct that is not actionable
as civil securities fraud to nonetheless be criminally prosecuted.
A. Differing Materiality Standardsfor Wire and Mail Fraudand for
Securities Fraud Create the "'Wire/MailFraudRun-Around. "
Conduct cognizable as securities fraud is often within the scope of
the wire and mail fraud statutes. Securities fraud liability, both
civil and criminal, is premised on (1) a false or misleading
statement or omission (2) that is material and (3) made with
scienter. 1 Wire and mail fraud require the following elements: (1)
"existence of a scheme to defraud"; (2) "using or causing the use of
the mail [or wires] to execute the scheme"; and (3) "specific intent to
defraud." 2 Virtually every statement that could form the basis of a
securities fraud claim (e.g., a statement in an analyst call, in a
webcast, in a press release, or in a Securities and Exchange
Commission filing) is disseminated via the wires or mail, thus
3
satisfying the jurisdictional requirement for mail or wire fraud.
For example, prosecutors have charged defendants with wire fraud
for allegedly making false statements in forms filed electronically

1

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128
S. Ct. 761, 768 (2008). Civil securities fraud also requires reliance by the plaintiff on the
defendant's statement or omission and resulting damages to the plaintiff. Id.
2 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1341, 1343 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008); United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d
316, 339 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081, 1104 (10th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Sayakhom, 186 F.3d 928, 941 (9th Cir. 1999).
3 See NATIONAL INVESTOR RELATIONS INSTITUTE, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR INVESTOR

RELATIONS 30 (3d ed. 2004) ("There are many different ways to reach investors and the
public; some of the most obvious technologies include the major wire services, conference
calls, broadcast fax and fax-on-demand services, e-mail, video conferences, Web sites and
electronic EDGAR filings.").

2009]

White Collar Crime's Gray Area

with the SEC, 4 in press releases distributed via the wires, 5 and in
analyst and investor conference calls. 6 In other words, if a
prosecutor determines that an individual defendant made an
allegedly false statement to investors, the prosecutor may often
choose whether to charge securities fraud, wire fraud, mail fraud, or
some combination thereof.
If the same statements were actionable as securities fraud, wire
fraud, and mail fraud, a prosecutor's decision to prosecute the
conduct as wire or mail fraud would have little practical
consequence, other than perhaps an increased incentive for the
defendant to accept a plea deal. Since each use of the mail or wires
can be separately charged, prosecutors have tremendous leverage in
of mail or
convincing defendants to plead guilty to just one count
7
counts.
numerous
on
trial
face
than
wire fraud-rather
The same statements are not, however, actionable as securities
fraud and as wire or mail fraud. The materiality standard for wire
and mail fraud is lower than for securities fraud, opening the door of
criminal prosecution to more statements. 8

4 E.g., Criminal Information at 2, United States v. Hurley, No. 1-04-cr-00123-PB (D.N.H.
May 18, 2004); Information at 10, United States v. Ayers, No. 2:03-cr-00183 (N.D. Ala. April
3, 2003); Indictment at 17, United States v. Wittig, No. 5:03-cr-40142-JAR (D. Kan. Dec. 3,
2003); Indictment at 16, United States v. Grabske, No. 3:01-cr-00324-CRB (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30,
2001). These charging documents are available on the website of the Department of Justice's
("DOJ") Corporate Fraud Task Force, at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftfl.
5 E.g., Indictment at 21-23, United States v. Scrushy, No. 2:03-cr-00530-KOB-TMP (N.D.
Ala. Oct. 29, 2003); Indictment at 5, United States v. Lash, No. 3:02-cr-00366-H (S.D. Cal.
Feb. 12, 2002); Indictment at 48-50, United States v. Polishan, No. 3:CR-96-274 (M.D. Pa.
Oct. 29, 1996). These charging documents are available on the website of the DOJ's
Corporate Fraud Task Force, at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/.
6 E.g., Indictment at 21-22, United States v. Scrushy, No. 2:03-cr-00530-KOB-TMP (N.D.
Ala. Oct. 29, 2003); Indictment at 5, United States v. Lash, No. 3:02-cr-00366-H (S.D. Cal.
Feb. 12, 2002); Information at 13, United States v. Giesecke, No. 2:02-cr-01028-PA (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 25, 2002). These charging documents are available on the website of the DOJ's
Corporate Fraud Task Force, at http:l/www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/.
7 Jennifer S. Recine, Note, Examination of the White Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements
in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1535, 1552 (2002) ("[A] prosecutor might use
the fact that the defendant could be charged with five hundred counts of mail fraud to secure
a plea on one count of mail fraud.").
s Similarly, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008), which imposes liability for
making false statements in a matter within the jurisdiction of the federal government, affords
a run-around for allegedly false statements contained in SEC filings because the materiality
standard under § 1001 is identical to the standard under the wire and mail fraud statutes.
See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (defining the materiality standard
under § 1001); United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1301 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming the
use of § 1001 to prosecute false statements in SEC filings).
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1. The Materiality Standard for Wire and Mail Fraud Is Lower
than for Securities Fraud.
Materiality is an essential element of securities fraud and of wire
and mail fraud, but materiality is defined differently in the two
contexts. The materiality bar to securities fraud liability is higher
than the materiality bar to wire and mail fraud liability.
In the securities fraud context, materiality is an objective
standard.9 A statement is material if 'there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important in deciding how to vote."' 10 In other words, "[i]t is not
enough that a statement is false or incomplete, if the
misrepresented fact is otherwise insignificant."1 1 This standard
depends on "the significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact to
a reasonable investor." 12 When applying this objective materiality
standard, courts routinely dismiss securities fraud claims based on
vague forward-looking statements and vague characterizations of
present fact.' 3 For example, courts have held that the following
statements are immaterial as a matter of law:
"Advanta's credit quality continues to be among the best in the
14
industry."
"Our emphasis on gold cards-and targeting of high quality
customer prospects with great potential for profitability-sets us
15
apart from other credit card issuers."
"Our superior cost structure for delivering and servicing financial
products allows us to achieve outstanding returns with highly
16
competitive pricing and flexibility."

9 TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445 (1976) ("The question of
materiality, it is universally agreed, is an objective one .... ").
10 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (quoting TSCIndus., 426 U.S. at 449).
11 Id. at 238.

TSCIndus., 426 U.S. at 445.
Jennifer O'Hare, The Resurrection of the Dodo: The Unfortunate Re-emergence of the
Puffery Defense in Private Securities Fraud Actions, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1697, 1718-20 (1998)
(identifying the types of statements that courts frequently dismiss as immaterial); see, e.g.,
City of Monroe Employees Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 671 (6th Cir. 2005)
("[Statements describing a product in terms of 'quality' or 'best' or benefiting from 'aggressive
marketing' are too squishy, too untethered to anything measurable, to communicate anything
that a reasonable person would deem important to a securities investment decision.");
Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 372 (5th Cir. 2004) ("The
generalized, positive statements about the company's competitive strengths, experienced
management, and future prospects are not actionable because they are immaterial.").
14 In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 537-39 (3d Cir. 1999).
12
13

15 Id.
16

Id.
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"We believe that Food Lion's Extra Low Prices and its clean and
conveniently located stores are especially well suited to the
17
demands of our customers."
The company "was 'optimistic' about its earnings and 'expected'
8
Marlboro to perform well."'
The immateriality of allegedly fraudulent statements is one of the
most heavily litigated-and most frequently successful-issues in
securities fraud litigation. 9 In a recent study, David A. Hoffman
analyzed 472 securities fraud opinions and found that 385 of them
addressed materiality. 20 Of those addressing materiality, forty-four
percent dismissed at least one claim as immaterial as a matter of
21
law.
In the wire and mail fraud context, on the other hand, materiality
is a subjective standard. In the landmark Supreme Court case
imposing a materiality requirement in wire and mail fraud cases,
Neder v. United States, the Court cited with approval two
definitions of materiality. 22
The first definition, previously
articulated in United States v. Gaudin23 and subsequently adopted
by most courts for use in wire and mail fraud cases, 24 states: "[A]
false statement is material if it has 'a natural tendency to influence,
or [is] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking
body to which it was addressed."' 25 The second definition is derived
from the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which instructs that
a matter is material if: '(a) a reasonable man would attach
importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining
his choice of action in the transaction in question;' or '(b) the
maker of the representation knows or has reason to know
Longman v. Food Lion, Inc., 197 F.3d 675, 685 (4th Cir. 1999).
San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., 75 F.3d
801, 811 (2d Cir. 1996).
19 See O'Hare, supra note 13, at 1697 (recognizing that "the puffery defense is alive and
well").
20 David A. Hoffman, The "Duty" to Be a Rational Shareholder, 90 MINN. L. REV. 537, 563
(2006).
21 Id. at 564; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize?
(The Same Way Everybody Else Does-Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud
Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 116 n.94 (2002) (surveying motions to dismiss and finding that
over 70 percent of the surveyed motions involved materiality determinations in favor of the
defendants).
22 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999) (holding that "materiality of falsehood is
an element of the federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes").
23 United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995).
24 E.g., United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 339 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v.
McAuliffe, 490 F.3d 526, 531 (6th Cir. 2007).
26 Neder, 527 U.S. at 16 (quoting Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509).
17
18
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that its recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as
important in determining his choice of action, although a

reasonable man would not so regard

it.'26

Both definitions of materiality cited in Neder include within their
reach statements that an objectively reasonable person would not
regard as important. The Gaudin definition includes statements
that, although not having a "natural tendency to influence," are
nonetheless "capable of influencing' the decision. Similarly, part (b)
of the Restatement definition explicitly extends to statements that a
reasonable person would not regard as important in determining his
choice of action. Consistent with these definitions, the Ninth
Circuit has rejected the argument that an objective materiality
standard should be applied in wire and mail fraud cases. 27 In
addition, the Eleventh Circuit has noted that the materiality
threshold for wire and mail fraud is akin to a "minimal relevance"
standard.28
The subjective materiality standard used in wire and mail fraud
cases is also consistent with the companion doctrine, adopted by a
majority of the circuits, that a victim's gullibility is irrelevant to
liability for wire or mail fraud. 29 A few circuits have, without
connecting their pronouncements to the materiality standard,
stated that a fraudulent scheme must be credible enough to
influence a reasonable person in order to be actionable as wire or
mail fraud. 30 The trend, however, is away from this minority rule
Id. at 22 n.5 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1977)).
United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1190-91 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the
defendant's argument that the mail fraud materiality instruction should require that "for a
statement to be material, it must be 'important' to a reasonable person" and reaffirming that
"[t]he laws against fraud are designed to protect the naive and careless as well as the
experienced and careful").
28 Fla. State Conference of the NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1173-74 (11th Cir.
2008) (noting that "in the federal criminal mail and wire fraud context, materiality seems to
take on a much lower evidentiary threshold").
29 See United States v. Thomas, 377 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that a victim's
gullibility is irrelevant); United States v. Maxwell, 920 F.2d 1028, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
("Appellant is simply wrong, however, if she means to assert that the wire fraud statute does
not apply where the persons defrauded unreasonably believed the misrepresentations made to
them."); United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 311 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding that, when enacting
the mail fraud statute, there was "no intention on the part of Congress to differentiate
between schemes that will ensnare the ordinary prudent investor and those that attract only
those with lesser mental acuity"); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS'
available at
§
9-43.100
(1997),
MANUAL
CRIMINAL
RESOURCE
MANUAL,
[hereinafter CRIMINAL
www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading-roomlusam/title9/title9.htm
RESOURCE MANUAL] (instructing that mail or wire fraud liability is not affected by the
gullibility of the victims).
30 See United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 416 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that a mail
26
27
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and toward using the credibility of the scheme merely as an
indicator of whether the defendant possessed the requisite intent to
defraud.31
2. Prosecutors Are Using the Wire/Mail Fraud Run-Around.
Prosecutors may evade the objective materiality standard
required under securities fraud jurisprudence by charging wire or
mail fraud rather than securities fraud. The data shows that
prosecutors are indeed as eager to charge conduct sounding in
securities fraud as wire or mail fraud.
The criminal cases chosen by the Department of Justice's ("DOJ")
Corporate Fraud Task Force as "Significant Criminal Cases and
Charging Documents" provide a telling snapshot of how prosecutors
are using the wire and mail fraud statutes. Of the seventy-nine
cases sounding in securities fraud on this list, prosecutors charged
32
wire or mail fraud in forty-nine cases, or sixty-two percent.
Moreover, in forty-nine percent of the cases charging mail or wire
fraud for conduct sounding in securities fraud, prosecutors did not
33
even charge securities fraud.
Prosecutors' heavy reliance on wire and mail fraud is further
evidenced by the overall charging statistics. According to the data
compiled by the Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center for the
fraud scheme must "be credible enough to 'deceive persons of ordinary prudence and
comprehension'); United States v. Gray, 367 F.3d 1263, 1268, 1271 (11th Cir. 2004)
(affirming, paradoxically, both the use of the Gaudin definition of materiality in a mail fraud
case and holding that the misrepresentation must be one that 'a reasonable person would
have acted on"' (quoting United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1996))).
31 Thomas, 377 F.3d at 243 (explaining that the ordinary prudence standard is meant to be
helpful in gauging a defendant's intent and "is not a shield which a defendant may use to
avoid a conviction for a deliberately fraudulent scheme"); see also Mark Zingale, Note,
Fashioning a Victim Standard in Mail and Wire Fraud: Ordinarily Prudent Person or
Monumentally Credulous Gull?, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 827 (1999) (proposing to resolve the
circuit split by using the subjective standard in order to focus on the defendant's intent).
32 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Corporate Fraud Task Force, Significant Criminal Cases and
Charging Documents, http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/cases.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
This data was compiled from a set of seventy-nine charging documents which were selected
using the following criteria: First, all documents charging securities fraud for a false
misrepresentation or omission, as opposed to insider trading, were included in the set.
Second, all documents charging wire or mail fraud and sounding in securities fraud were
included in the set. Third, for purposes of this set, documents charging only conspiracy to
commit securities, mail, or wire fraud-but not charging an underlying offense of securities,
mail, or wire fraud-were excluded. Fourth, documents naming a corporate defendant, rather
than an individual defendant, were excluded from the set. A chart of the seventy-nine
documents included in the set, as well as a list of all charging documents listed on the
website, is on file with the author and is available for review upon request.
33 Id.
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years 1999 through 2006, the number of defendants charged with
securities fraud is dwarfed by the number charged with mail or wire
fraud. On average during this time period, 119 defendants were
charged with securities fraud each year.3 4 During this same period,
an average of 720 defendants were charged with mail fraud per
year, and an average of 404 defendants were charged with wire
fraud per year. 35 In other words, on average, almost ten times as
many defendants were charged with mail or wire fraud as with
securities fraud. Even taking into account that many wire and mail
fraud cases do not sound in securities fraud, the disparity is
staggering.
Prosecutors' predilection for using the wire and mail fraud
statutes to prosecute white collar crime has not gone unnoticed.
Congress recognized, and approved of, the use of mail and wire
fraud to prosecute corporate executives' wrongdoing when it passed
the White Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act of 2002 (the
"WCCPA") as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
The WCCPA
increased the maximum sentences for mail and wire fraud from five
years to twenty years. 36 By including these enhancements in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was intended to address corporate
fraud, 37 Congress implicitly approved the use of the mail and wire
fraud statutes to prosecute corporate executives. Moreover, on the
40
39
Senate floor, Senators Trent Lott, 38 Joe Biden, and Orrin Hatch

34 See Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center, http://fjsrc.urban.org (last visited Nov. 21, 2008). The
data can be selected for the following variables: (1) statistic (here, "number of defendants in cases filed");
(2) year (here, 1999 through 2006); and (3) type of charge (here, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000) and 18 U.S.C.A. §
1348 (West Supp. 2008)).
35 See Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center, http://fjsrc.urban.org (last visited Nov.
21, 2008). The data can be selected for the following variables: (1) statistic (here, "number of
defendants in cases filed"); (2) year (here, 1999 through 2006); and (3) type of charge (here, 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 1341, 1343 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008)).
36 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1341, 1343 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-204, § 903, 116 Stat. 745, 798 (2002).
37 H.R. REP. No. 107-610, at 69 (2002) (Conf. Rep.) (explaining that one of the purposes of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is "to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of
corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws").
38 148 Cong. Rec. S6545 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Lott) ("Wail fraud and
wire fraud statutes are often used in criminal cases involving corporate wrongdoing. So
obviously this is an area that is of concern and needs to be addressed.").
39 148 Cong. Rec. S6549 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Biden) ("When these
penalty enhancements are taken in combination with the new 10-year felony for securities
fraud contained in the amendment I have co-sponsored with Senator Leahy, the Government
will have the full range of prosecutorial arrows in its quiver to fight pension crooks and
corporate wrong doers.").
40 148 Cong. Rec. S6550 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (Statement of Sen. Hatch) ("Because
prosecutors frequently use the mail and wire statutes to charge acts of corporate misconduct,
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explicitly voiced their approval of this use of the mail and wire fraud
statutes. In addition, numerous commentators have recognized that
prosecutors rely heavily on wire and mail fraud to prosecute white
collar crime. 41 In fact, the DOJ has explicitly encouraged its
prosecutors to consider the mail and wire fraud statutes as
"important tools" to address fraud within the scope of other criminal
42
statutes.
3. The Wire/Mail Fraud Run-Around Results in the Criminalization
of Conduct That Is Not Civilly Actionable.
The wire/mail fraud run-around permits defendants to be held
criminally liable for conduct that does not violate the securities
fraud statutes. Unlike the securities fraud statutes, the wire and
mail fraud statutes do not have companion civil causes of action. 43
As a consequence, civil plaintiffs may not use the wire/mail fraud
run-around, resulting in the criminalization of conduct not civilly
actionable.
This anomaly has gone unremarked.
Although courts have
rejected the argument that a more general criminal statute, like the
mail and wire fraud statutes, should not be used to prosecute
conduct that is more narrowly addressed in another criminal
statute, 44 courts have not specifically addressed whether it is
it is important that we ensure that the penalties that apply to such offenses are sufficiently
severe to deter and punish corporate wrongdoers.").
41 Luke Alverson, Sarbanes-Oxley §§ 302 & 906: Corporate Reform or Legislative
Redundancy? A CriticalLook at the "New" Corporate Responsibilityfor FinancialReports, 33
SEC. REG. L.J. 15, 27 (2005) (recognizing that mail fraud "has a history of being used in
prosecuting securities violations arising from filings containing false information"); Peter R.
Ezersky, Note, Intra-CorporateMail and Wire Fraud: Criminal Liability For Fiduciary
Breach, 94 YALE L.J. 1427, 1441-42 & n.63 (1985) (suggesting that the "open-ended elements"
of mail and wire fraud allow prosecutors to establish criminal liability "on the cheap"); Jed S.
Rakoff, The Federal Mail FraudStatute (Part1), 18 DuQ. L. REV. 771, 771 (1980) (from the
perspective of a former federal prosecutor of white collar crime, describing the mail fraud
statute as "our Stradivarius, our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart-and our true
love").
42 See CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 29, § 955 ("The mail fraud and wire fraud
statutes are becoming important tools in prosecutions of a) RICO violations, b) money
laundering, c) financial institution fraud, and d) telemarketing fraud. Mail and wire fraud
violations that support prosecutions in these areas can result in more severe sanctions and
can form the basis for civil or criminal forfeiture.").
43 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1341, 1343 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008).
44 For example, in United States v. Bilzerian, a split panel of the Second Circuit affirmed
the use of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 to prosecute conduct within the scope of the antifraud provisions
of the securities statutes, despite the Second Circuit's then-applicable (and now overruled)
decisions that materiality was not an element of § 1001. 926 F.2d 1285, 1300 (2d Cir. 1991)
("It is settled law that 'when an act violates more than one criminal statute, the Government
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appropriate to use a general criminal statute to criminalize conduct
that is not even civilly actionable. Moreover, those decrying the
expansive interpretation of the mail and wire fraud statutes have
not objected that it criminalizes conduct that is not even civilly
actionable. 4 5 Even the Supreme Court appears to have overlooked
this bizarre ramification of the breadth of the wire and mail fraud
statutes. In United States v. O'Hagan, the majority mused that
"practical consequences for individual defendants might not be
large" if misappropriation conduct were classified as mail fraud but
not securities fraud. 46 This rumination failed to recognize the
impact on individual defendants' exposure to civil liability. If the
conduct were classified as securities fraud, the defendants would be
subject to civil liability for insider trading to contemporaneous
traders. 47 If the conduct in O'Hagan was classified as mail fraud
48
but not securities fraud, no private right of action would exist.
B. A "Safe Harbor"Shields Forward-LookingStatements from Civil,
but Not Criminal, Liability.
A second substantive reason for the anomalous civil and criminal
treatment of conduct sounding in securities fraud is the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act's ("PSLRA") "safe harbor" for
forward-looking statements. The safe harbor shields an individual
defendant from civil liability based on a false forward-looking
statement if one of two disjunctive prongs is satisfied: (1) the
statement is "identified as a forward-looking statement, and is
accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying
important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially
from those in the forward-looking statement"; or (2) "the plaintiff

may prosecute under either so long as it does not discriminate against any class of
defendants."' (quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-24 (1979))). The
dissenting judge rejected this reasoning because it rendered superfluous the materiality
requirement contained in the securities laws. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d at 1305 (Winter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
45 E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing Story of the
"Evolution" of a White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1983) (protesting the
extension of criminal liability to the bounds of civil liability).
46 521 U.S. 642, 678 n.25 (1997).
47 See 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (2006).
48 When O'Hagan was decided, Congress had already prohibited civil plaintiffs from using
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") to evade the securities
laws. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006) (containing the amendment that, when pursuing a civil
RICO action, "no person may rely upon any conduct that would have been actionable as fraud
in the purchase or sale of securities to establish a violation").
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fails to prove that the forward-looking statement was made with
actual knowledge by that person that the statement. . . was false or
misleading." 49 For example, if one of the prongs is met, the safe
harbor
protects
"earnings
estimates,"50
predictions
that
restructuring efforts "will lead to improved profitability," 5' and
52
expectations that initiatives will "restore" positive cash flow.
Under the plain language of the statute, a defendant is protected
from civil liability if a forward-looking statement is accompanied by
meaningful cautionary language-regardless of whether the
defendant has actual knowledge that the forward-looking statement
is false. This interpretation, although dramatic, is supported by the
legislative history of the PSLRA, 53 the cases interpreting the safe
55
harbor, 54 and the commentators.
Not surprisingly, virtually every analyst call and SEC filing is
accompanied by cautionary language, 56 and the safe harbor is
frequently invoked by defendants to shield themselves from civil
liability. For instance, out of a set of 248 civil securities fraud
opinions issued by federal district courts in 2006 and 2007, the safe
harbor was analyzed at least sixty-seven times.5 7 In other words,
49 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i)-(B)(i) (2006).
50
51

Miller v. Champion Enters., Inc., 346 F.3d 660, 677 (6th Cir. 2003).
Theoharous v. Fong, 256 F.3d 1219, 1226 (11th Cir. 2001).

Id.
53 H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 44 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
52

743 ("The first prong of the safe harbor requires courts to examine only the cautionary
statement accompanying the forward-looking statement. Courts should not examine the state
of mind of the person making the statement.").
54 Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 371 (5th Cir. 2004)
("The safe harbor has two independent prongs: one focusing on the defendant's cautionary
statements and the other on the defendant's state of mind."); Miller, 346 F.3d at 672 ("In
other words, if the statement qualifies as 'forward-looking' and is accompanied by sufficient
cautionary language, a defendant's statement is protected regardless of the actual state of
mind.").
-5 Herbert S. Wander, Securities Law Disclosure After Sarbanes.Oxley, SN071 ALI-ABA
797, 899 (2008) (recognizing that the safe harbor permits courts to decide motions to dismiss
without examining the defendant's state of mind); Marc H. Folladori, Protecting ForwardLooking Statements: The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and Other
Safeguards, 14471 PLI/CORP. 505, 538 (2008) ("The two prongs of the Reform Act's safe
harbor are stated in the disjunctive and have thus been interpreted as constituting completely
separate and distinct routes to gain safe harbor protection ....In other words, a forwardlooking statement that is known to be false may still be protected if it is immaterial or
accompanied by sufficient cautionary language ....")(emphasis omitted).
56 Steven E. Bochner, Finding the Harbor: Advice for Companies on Navigating Federal
Securities
Litigation
Reform,
FINDLAW,
Jan.
1,
1998,
http:/Iibrary.findlaw.com/1998/Jan/l/130350.html
('Registration
statements
and,
increasingly, periodic reports now commonly include safe harbor language.").
57 The set of 248 opinions was compiled by performing the following "terms and connectors"
search in the DCT Westlaw database: ti("securities litigation!") & "securities fraud" & "motion

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 72

the court addressed the safe harbor in twenty-seven percent of the
opinions. Moreover, the safe harbor is so effective at protecting
forward-looking statements that the number of securities class
58
actions alleging false predictions has continued to decline.
The safe harbor does not protect a defendant from criminal
liability, however. By its terms, it applies only to "any private
action arising under this chapter." 59 As a result, a defendant who
makes a false forward-looking statement accompanied by
meaningful cautionary language is shielded from civil liability but
may be criminally prosecuted. For example, corporate executives
have been indicted for making the following allegedly false
predictions:
WorldCom is certainly not immune to the effects of the
economy. We are being impacted like everyone else. But,
with the visibility we have in our significant growth engines,
we continue to have confidence in our ability to achieve our
[twelve] to [fifteen percent] 2001 growth target on the
WorldCom tracker. And I guess the thing that always
frustrates me when I hear people talk about visibility as it's
kind of like landing a plane-how much visibility do you
really have? And so I thought I would just compare it to a
weather forecast and say that if we look out for the
remainder of 2001, we do not see any storms on the horizon
60
at this time.
"[W]e may well have that asset and operate that asset for quite
to dismiss" & da(aft 12/31/2005) & da(bef 1/1/2008). This search query retrieved all federal
district court opinions published in 2006 or 2007 with the words "securities litigation" in the
title and the terms "securities fraud" and "motion to dismiss" in the text. The subset of sixtyseven opinions was compiled by adding the following additional search terms to the query: &
("safe harbor" "meaningful cautionary language"). This search query narrowed the results to
only those in which either the phrase "safe harbor" or the phrase "meaningful cautionary
language" appears in the text.
58 See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CASE FILINGS, 2007: A YEAR IN

REVIEW 20 (2007), http://securities.cornerstone.com/pdfsfYIR2007.pdf ("The percentage of
filings alleging false forward-looking statements continued to modestly decline, with only
[sixty-three] percent of cases containing such allegations this year [2007] as opposed to
[seventy-one] percent in 2006."); see also CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION
CASE
FILINGS,
2006:
A
YEAR
IN
REVIEW
18-19
(2006),
http://securities.cornerstone.com/pdfs/YIR2006.pdf ("[W]hile the percentage of filings alleging
false forward looking statements had increased last year (from [sixty-seven] percent in 2004
to [eighty-two] percent in 2005), 2006 suggests a modest downward reversion with only
[seventy-three] percent of cases containing such allegations.").
59 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
60 Indictment at 20-21, United States v. Ebbers, No. S3:02-CR-1144-BSJ (S.D.N.Y. May
24, 2004) (quoting Bernard Ebbers' statements in an April 26, 2001 analyst call), availableat
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/cases-q_z.htm.
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some time. It's not a bad asset, it's a good asset, just like a lot of the
61
other assets in this portfolio."
In the context of civil securities litigation, these defendants would
have had a strong argument that their predictions were protected
by the safe harbor, but that argument was not available in their
criminal cases.
C. Aiders and Abettors of Securities FraudAre Subject to Criminal
Liability but Not Private Civil Liability.
Supreme Court precedent and congressional statutes interact to
cause the following result: aiding and abetting securities fraud is
criminally actionable and enforceable by the SEC, but private
plaintiffs may not recover damages from anyone but primary
violators of the securities laws.
In 1994, overruling "decades of lower court precedent that nearly
universally recognized the propriety of ...secondary liability," 62 the
Supreme Court in Central Bank of Denver v. FirstInterstateBank of
Denver held that a private civil plaintiff may not assert a cause of
action for aiding and abetting under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act. 63 The Court reasoned that the text of the statute
does not mention "aiding" or "abetting"; and the Court inferred that,
since Congress did not attach aiding and abetting liability to any of
the express causes of action in the securities acts, it would have
been unlikely to attach aiding and abetting liability to § 10(b) if it
had been an express, rather than an implied, cause of action. 64 The
Court's reasoning was widely interpreted as applying equally to
abolish SEC enforcement actions against aiders and abettors. 65 The
general United States Code provision imposing criminal liability for
aiding or abetting an offense against the United States, however,
preserved criminal liability for aiding and abetting securities
66
fraud.

61 Superseding Indictment at 33-34, United States v. Causey, No. H-04-25 (S.D. Tex. July
7, 2004) (quoting Kenneth Lay's statements in an October 16, 2001 analyst call), available at
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/usvlay70704ind.pdf.
62 Marc I. Steinberg, The Ramificationsof Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisionson Federal
and State Securities Regulation, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 489, 489 (1995).
63 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994).
64 Id. at 175-78.
65 Steinberg, supra note 62, at 497. "Unless Congress swiftly acts to counter the Court's
decision, Central Bank of Denver will adversely affect the Securities and Exchange
Commission's ...enforcement program ....
" Id. at 489-90 (footnote omitted).
66 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2000).
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In 1995, after debating whether to overrule or ratify Central
Bank, Congress chose to forge a middle road. Congress declined to
amend the Securities Exchange Act to provide for private aiding and
abetting liability, reasoning that it would be "contrary to [the bill's]
goal of reducing meritless securities litigation." 67 Congress did,
however, explicitly recognize the SEC's right to premise
6
enforcement actions on aiding and abetting conduct.
Finally, in 2002, in response to public outcry over recent corporate
scandals, Congress commissioned the SEC to conduct a study to
determine the number of securities professionals who, during the
period from 1998 to 2001, were found to have "aided and abetted a
violation of the Federal securities laws." 69 The commissioning of
this study implied that, depending on the results, Congress might
extend private civil liability to aiders and abettors.70 The study,
published in 2003, reported enforcement actions against 1,713
securities professionals during the time period. 7 1 Out of these 1,713
securities professionals, only 297 were found to have aided and
abetted a violation of the securities laws and, of those, only thirteen
were not also found to have committed a primary violation. 72 The
results of the study cut two ways. On the one hand, the paucity of
aiding and abetting violations suggested that aiding and abetting
behavior was not widespread, obviating the need to expand private
civil liability. On the other hand, the results suggested that the
SEC might not be aggressively pursuing mere aiders and abettors
and that the expansion of private civil liability to aiding and
abetting conduct would fill that gap. 73 In addition, notably, the
study did not address the number of securities professionals
criminally convicted of aiding and abetting securities fraud.
Congress has not acted in response to the SEC's report, and private
67 S. REP. No. 104-98, at 19 (1995), as reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 698.
68 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2000); S. REP. No. 104-98, at 19 ("The Committee does, however,
grant the SEC express authority to bring actions seeking injunctive relief or money damages
against persons who knowingly aid and abet primary violators of the securities laws.").
69 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 703, 116 Stat. 745, 798 (2002).
70 C. Evan Stewart, Holding Lawyers Accountable in the Post-Enron Feeding Frenzy, 34
SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1587, 1587 n.4 (2002) ("The only logical inference is that some members
of Congress are contemplating legislation to overturn the Supreme Court's [decision in
CentralBank of Denver]." (citation omitted)).
71 REPORT OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: SECTION 703 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, STUDY AND REPORT ON VIOLATIONS BY SECURITIES
PROFESSIONALS 5 (2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/sox703report.pdf.
72 Id.
73 See generally Celia R. Taylor, Breaking the Bank: ReconsideringCentral Bank of Denver

After Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley, 71 Mo. L. REV. 367, 387-88 (2006).
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aiding and abetting actions remain unavailable under the federal
securities acts.
D. CriminalLiability Under State Law Is Sometimes Broader than
Civil Liability Under Federalor State Law.
State criminal offenses are sometimes broader in scope than the
civil causes of action that are available to private plaintiffs. Two
factors contribute to this effect.
First, state securities acts
occasionally impose broad criminal liability without creating a
companion private right of action-subjecting a white collar
defendant to the prospect of criminal sanction but not affording
injured investors a remedy. Second, even if a state securities act
affords plaintiffs a private right of action, the broad preemption
imposed by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act often
renders the private cause of action illusory.
1. A Few State Securities Acts Impose Broad Criminal Liability
Without Creating a Private Right of Action.
New York's securities act, the Martin Act, 74 is a prime example of
a state securities act that criminalizes conduct that is not civilly
actionable. The Martin Act imposes criminal liability for conduct
that would not be civilly or criminally actionable under the federal
securities acts, but the Martin Act does not afford injured investors
75
a private right of action.
First, under the Martin Act, an individual defendant is guilty of a
misdemeanor, "punishable by a fine of not more than five hundred
dollars, or imprisonment for not more than one year or both,"76 for
making a false statement if he or she "(i) knew the truth; or (ii) with
reasonable effort could have known the truth; or (iii) made no
reasonable effort to ascertain the truth; or (iv) did not have
knowledge concerning the representation or statement made. ....,77
In other words, the Martin Act essentially eliminates the scienter
requirement, 78 which is an element of both civil and criminal
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352-359-h (McKinney 1996).
CPC Int'l Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 514 N.E.2d 116, 119 (N.Y. 1987) (recognizing that the
Martin Act does not expressly create a private right of action and refusing to imply such a
right).
76 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 359-g(2) (McKinney 1996).
77 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352-c(1)(c) (McKinney 1996).
78 Frank C. Razzano, The Martin Act: An Overview, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 125, 129 (2006)
("A showing of neither intent nor scienter is required to prove a violation of the Act and
74
75
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liability under the federal securities laws. Civil securities fraud
requires a showing of at least recklessness, 79 and criminal federal
securities fraud requires a showing of willfulness. s0
One
commentator has noted that the Martin Act "seems to create strict
liability for uttering a false statement. 8 1 As a result, a defendant
who negligently makes a false statement could be held criminally
liable under the Martin Act, despite the fact that the same conduct
neither implicates federal criminal liability nor affords a civil
82
remedy.
Second, the Martin Act's definition of "security"8 3 is potentially
more expansive than the definition of "security" under the federal
securities acts,8 4 including more conduct within its reach than
within the scope of the federal securities laws. For example, in
1996, John Moscow, then of the Manhattan District Attorney's
Office, issued the following warning to attorneys:
If any of you participate in the syndication of loans, you are
involved in the negotiation, purchase and sale of securities in
New York .... If any of you participate in transactions
involving mineral leases, those are securities. Likewise, a
bunch of other things that you might not think of are covered
85
as securities.

sustain civil liability or criminal culpability, unless a felony is charged. The purpose of the
Act is to allow the Attorney General to prosecute acts and practices beyond intentional

fraud.").
79 Miller v. Champion Enters., Inc., 346 F.3d 660, 672 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming that
recklessness is the state of mind required for securities fraud); In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig.,
180 F.3d 525, 535 (3d Cir. 1999) (affirming that recklessness is the state of mind required for
securities fraud); Nic Heuer, Les Reese & Winston Sale, Securities Fraud, 44 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 955, 964-65 & n.51 (2007) (compiling cases).
80 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 2008) (criminalizing "willful violations" of the
securities laws); Heuer, Reese & Sale, supra note 79, at 958.
81 Razzano, supra note 78, at 128 n.21.
82 See Johnathan Mathiesen, Dr. Spitzlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love
"Balkanization," 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 311, 316 (noting that the Martin Act "affords
extraordinary leverage as a prosecutorial weapon in part from its lack of a scienter
requirement").
83 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 352(1) (McKinney 1996) (defining "security" to include "any
stocks, bonds, notes, evidences of interest or indebtedness or other securities, including oil
and mineral deeds or leases and any interest therein, sold or transferred in whole or in part to
the purchaser where the same do not effect a transfer of the title in fee simple to the land, or
negotiable documents of title, or foreign currency orders, calls or options therefor[e]").
84 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(a)(1) (West 1997 & Supp. 2008) (defining "security" under the 1933
Act); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(10) (West 1997 & Supp. 2008) (defining "security" under the 1934
Act); Wendy Gerwick Couture, The SecuritiesActs' Treatment of Notes Maturing in Less Than
Nine Months: A Solution to the Enigma, 31 SEC. REG. L.J. 496, 497 (2003) (attempting to
reconcile the discrepancies between the definitions in the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act).
85 John Moscow, InternationalSecurities Disputes, 7 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 244,
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Finally, consistent with its broad purpose of "prevent[ing] all
kinds of fraud in connection with the sale of securities and
commodities and to defeat all unsubstantial and visionary schemes
86
in relation thereto whereby the public is fraudulently exploited,"
the Martin Act is generally interpreted more loosely than its federal
counterpart.8 7 The terms of the Act are given a wide meaning, so as
to include all acts which do by their tendency to deceive or mislead
the purchasing public come within the purpose of the law.8 8 As a
result, it is possible to be convicted for conduct under the Martin Act
that is neither civilly nor criminally actionable under the federal
For example, in a recent case, a defendant
securities laws.
convicted of a Martin Act violation for failing to make certain
disclosures in SEC filings argued on appeal that one of the
disclosures was not required under federal law and could not,
therefore, form the basis of state criminal liability.8 9 The appellate
court rejected this argument as unavailing because federal law does
not preempt state law in this context. 90
New York's criminalization of conduct not civilly actionable has a
sweeping impact because of the Martin Act's broad reach. The
criminal provisions apply to all false statements "engaged in to
induce or promote the issuance, distribution, exchange, sale,
negotiation or purchase within or from this state of any securities or
commodities." 91 This territorial reach is arguably satisfied in
virtually every case involving a publicly traded security because the
New York Stock Exchange is located in New York, the National
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System
("NASDAQ") is headquartered in New York, 92 and business

244 (1996).
86 People v. Federated Radio Corp., 154 N.E. 655, 657 (N.Y. 1926).
87 State v. McLeod, No. 403855/02, 2006 WL 1374014, at *6 n.8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2006)
("Because that activity resulted in Ebbers' conviction of federal securities fraud, and because
the Martin Act requires less stringent proof than the federal securities laws do, it is clear that
Ebbers could also be found liable for violating the Martin Act.").
88 Id. at *4.
89 Brief for Defendant-Appellant Kozlowski, People v. Kozlowski, 846 N.Y.S.2d 44 (N.Y.
App. Div. Oct. 3, 2006) (No. 5259/02), 2006 WL 2993199 ("[T]he defendants may well have
been convicted for failing to volunteer information in federal filings that they were not
required to disclose .... ").
90 People v. Kozlowski, 846 N.Y.S.2d 44 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007).
91 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-c(1)(c) (McKinney 1996). This territorial reach is consistent
with the general geographical scope of New York's penal laws. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
20.20 (McKinney 2003) (defining the geographical jurisdiction of New York's offenses).
92 See NASDAQ, Contact NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/help/contactInformation.stm
(last visited Dec. 2, 2008).
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transactions are routinely negotiated and financed in New York. 93
New York's state prosecutors have certainly interpreted the
territorial reach of the Martin Act's criminal provisions broadly.
For example, Mr. Moscow gave the following example of the breadth
of the Martin Act's criminal provisions: "There was one Japanese
swindler who committed a fraud from Miami on some people in
Denver who is being prosecuted in New York because the stock was
offered for sale here. His fraud affected the market price, and he is
94
covered by the statute."
2. State Securities Acts May Purport to Impose Broad Criminal and
Civil Liability, but the Civil Liability Is Preempted.
Many state securities acts purport to expand the scope of criminal
and civil liability beyond the scope of civil liability under the federal
securities acts. For example, most state securities acts extend civil
and criminal liability to aiders and abettors rather than merely to
primary violators. 9 5 Further, state securities acts usually do not
include safe harbors for forward-looking statements. 96
These broad state civil liability provisions are preempted,
however, when asserted in most class actions. 97 In general, the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act ("SLUSA") authorizes
the removal and dismissal of state law class actions 98 alleging fraud
93 Aaron M. Tidman, Note, Securities Law Enforcement in the Twenty-First Century: Why
States Are Better Equipped Than the Securities and Exchange Commission to Enforce
Securities Law, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 379, 391-92 (2007) ("Almost all public companies are
traded in New York on the NYSE or the NASDAQ, so almost all securities touch the state and
fall within the Martin Act's jurisdiction.").
94 See Moscow, supra note 85, at 246.
95 David M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The Securities Litigation Uniform StandardsAct
of 1998: The Sun Sets on California'sBlue Sky Laws, 54 BUS. LAW. 1, 3 (1998) ("Most state
blue-sky laws, by contrast, afford investors broader relief than currently available under
federal law, including ... aiding and abetting liability."); Steinberg, supra note 62, at 512
(1995) ("A number of the state statutes extend liability exposure to those who materially aid
in consummating the transaction."); Richard H. Walker, David M. Levine & Adam C.
Pritchard, The New Securities Class Action: Federal Obstacles, State Detours, 39 ARIZ. L. REV.
641, 677 (1997) (noting the allure of aiding and abetting liability under state securities law);
see also supra text accompanying notes 62-73 (discussing in detail aider and abettor liability
under the federal securities laws).
96 See Levine & Pritchard, supra note 95, at 12 (recognizing the absence of state court safe
harbors for forward-looking statements); see also supra text accompanying notes 49-55
(discussing in detail the safe harbor for forward-looking statements under the federal
securities laws).
97 Levine & Pritchard, supra note 95, at 3 ('The Uniform Standards Act makes federal
antifraud provisions, governed by the Reform Act, the exclusive national standard for most
securities fraud class actions.").
98 In general, SLUSA applies to lawsuits in which damages are sought on behalf of more
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in connection with the purchase or sale of securities that are traded
nationally and listed on a regulated national exchange. 99 As a
result, the expansive civil liability available under state securities
law is often rendered illusory. 10 0
SLUSA does not, however, preempt criminal prosecutions. After
the civil liability provisions of state securities acts are preempted by
SLUSA, the broad criminal liability provisions remain. As a
consequence, state securities acts that impose liability beyond the
scope of civil liability under the federal securities acts effectively
criminalize conduct that is not civilly actionable.
E. CriminalIndictments Are Less Likely to Be DismissedPretrial
than Civil Complaints.
In addition to substantive differences between criminal and civil
enforcement of securities fraud, procedural differences contribute to
the anomalous result that a defendant may be held criminally liable
despite the fact that a civil lawsuit based on the same allegations
would not survive dismissal. First, the pleading standards are far
stricter for civil securities fraud complaints than for criminal
securities fraud indictments. Second, motions to dismiss are more
favored in civil securities fraud cases than in criminal cases. As a
result, far more civil securities fraud cases are dismissed pretrial
than criminal cases.
1. The PSLRA's Pleading Standards Are Stricter than the Pleading
Standards for Criminal Indictments.
In 1995, Congress, with the goal of curtailing abusive strike suits,
imposed strict pleading standards for private securities litigation. 10 1
In order to survive dismissal for failure to satisfy these pleading
standards, a complaint must "specify each statement alleged to have
than 50 people. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(B) (2006).
99 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b)-(c) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1) (2006); Levine & Pritchard, supra
note 95, at 14 (explaining that SLUSA "preempts most securities fraud class actions brought
in state court").
100 Levine & Pritchard, supra note 95, at 3 ("The Uniform Standards Act makes federal
antifraud provisions, governed by the Reform Act, the exclusive national standard for most
securities fraud class actions.").
101 S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694 ("The
Securities Subcommittee has heard ample testimony on the need to establish a uniform and
stringent pleading requirement to curtail the filing of abusive lawsuits."); Wander, supra note
55, at 894 (explaining that "[pileading standards were raised, especially those regarding 'state
of mind allegations,' i.e. scienter").
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been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is
misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or
omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall
state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed." 10 2
Moreover, the complaint must "state with particularity facts giving
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind."'103 These stringent pleading standards, which must
be satisfied before a plaintiff has performed any discovery, 10 4 nip in
the bud many civil securities fraud cases. 10 5
Unlike a civil securities fraud complaint, a criminal indictment
need not allege fraud with particularity. An indictment need only
be "a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential
facts constituting the offense charged." 106 In other words, an
indictment is sufficient as long as it "'(1) contains the elements of
the offense intended to be charged, (2) sufficiently apprises the
defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, and (3) allows the
defendant to show with accuracy to what extent he may plead a
former acquittal or conviction in the event of a subsequent
0 7
prosecution."'1
As a result of these different pleading standards, a complaint and
an indictment containing identical securities fraud allegations could
be treated quite differently. Theoretically, the civil complaint could
be dismissed under the PSLRA, while the criminal indictment could
survive dismissal.
2. Pretrial Motions to Dismiss Are More Favored in Civil Securities
Fraud Cases than in Criminal Cases.
The motion to dismiss is an essential step in a civil securities
102 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2006); Southland Secs. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365
F.3d 353, 362-63 (5th Cir. 2004) ('The PSLRA reinforces the particularity requirements of
Rule 9(b), requiring the plaintiffs to state not only the time, place, the identity of the speaker,
and the content of the alleged misrepresentation, but also to explain why the challenged
statement or omission is false or misleading.").
103 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006).
104 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006).
105 City of Monroe Employees Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 682 (6th Cir.
2005) ("[T]o survive a motion to dismiss, a federal securities fraud claim must 'withstand an
exacting statement-by-statement analysis'...." (quoting In re First Union Corp. Sec. Litig.,
128 F. Supp. 2d 871, 886 (W.D.N.C. 2001))); Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 21, at 131
(recognizing that "particularity requirements serve as a quick and easy way of getting rid of
securities fraud cases").
106 FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1).
107 United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 280 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v.
Vitillo, 490 F.3d 314, 321 (3d Cir. 2007)).
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fraud lawsuit. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly
recognize the availability of a motion to dismiss for "failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted,"1 0 8 and the PSLRA
instructs that a court "shall, on the motion of any defendant,
dismiss the complaint" if the pleading requirements are not met. 10 9
In fact, commentators have characterized the motion to dismiss
stage as "the primary battleground in the securities class action
area." 1 0
A motion to dismiss a criminal indictment is less favored. The
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not explicitly recognize the
right to file a motion to dismiss an indictment, but Rule 12(b)(2)
does allow a party to "raise by pretrial motion any defense,
objection, or request that the court can determine without a trial of
the general issue.""1 Among other issues that can be determined
without a trial,1 2 the failure of an indictment to allege conduct
within the scope of a criminal statute is properly raised with a Rule
12(b)(2) motion. 113 As a practical matter, however, motions to
dismiss criminal indictments are rarely asserted. In fact, the
"system overview" prepared by the DOJ, which charts the progress
of a criminal case from arrest through eventual release from prison,
does not even recognize a motion to dismiss stage of the
114
proceedings.

FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
109 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A) (2006).
108

110Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 21, at 116 n.94.
111 FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2). The prior version of this rule explicitly recognized the right to
file a motion to dismiss: "defenses and objections raised before trial which heretofore could
have been raised by one or more of them [i.e., pleas, demurrers, or motions to quash] shall be
raised only by motion to dismiss or to grant appropriate relief, as provided in these rules."
FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(a) (amended in 2002).
"This provision was deleted in 2002 as
unnecessary." 1A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ANDREW LEIPOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 191 (4th ed. 2008).
112 WRIGHT & LEIPOLD, supra note 111, § 191 ("A Rule 12 motion is thus the proper method
to raise such matters as: the regularity of the proceedings of the grand jury; the sufficiency of
the indictment or information; requests for severance or the propriety of joinder of offenses or
defendants; the propriety of venue; double jeopardy; bills of particulars; depositions and
discovery; transfer to another place for trial; suppression of evidence; dismissal for want of a
speedy trial; and other matters that can be determined without a trial." (footnotes omitted)).
113 United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 685 (3d Cir. 2002) ("[F]or purposes of Rule
12(b)(2), a charging document fails to state an offense if the specific facts alleged in the
charging document fall beyond the scope of the relevant criminal statute, as a matter of
statutory interpretation.").
114 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL
JUSTICE
STATISTICS,
2004
7
fig.S.1
(2004),
available
at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.govfbjs/pub/pdf/cfjs04.pdf.
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3. More Civil Securities Fraud Cases Are Dismissed Pretrial than
Criminal Securities Fraud Cases.
As a result of these two procedural differences-the pleading
standard and the prevalence of motions to dismiss-far more civil
securities fraud cases are dismissed pretrial than criminal
securities fraud cases.
A large percentage of motions to dismiss civil securities fraud
complaints are granted. 5 According to a report published by
Cornerstone Research, for each year from 2001 through 2005, an
average of thirty-eight percent of the securities class actions filed
each year were dismissed. 116 This average excludes cases that were
resolved through settlement and dismissed by agreement. 1 7 The
percentage increases if partial dismissals are taken into account.
According to one survey, seventy-nine percent of motions to dismiss
securities fraud class actions were granted at least in part. 118
In contrast, few criminal securities fraud cases are dismissed
pretrial.
According to data compiled by the Federal Justice
Statistics Resource Center for the years 2001 through 2006, on
average only 8.36% of criminal securities fraud cases were
terminated each year by "dismissal or nolle prosequi."'1 9 This
statistic does not differentiate between those cases dismissed on the
prosecutor's motion and those dismissed on the defendant's motion.
Even assuming that all of these dismissals were on the basis of
defendants' motions to dismiss, the percentage of securities fraud
dismissals in criminal cases is dwarfed by the number in civil cases.

115Wander, supra note 55, at 916 ("[M]ore cases are being dismissed at the pleading
stage.").
116 See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CASE FILINGS, 2007: A YEAR IN
REVIEW 14 ex. 14 (2007), available at http://securities.cornerstone.com/pdfs/YIR2007.pdf.
According to this report, 32% of the securities class action cases filed in 2001, 34% of the cases
filed in 2002, 42% of the cases filed in 2003, 43% of the cases filed in 2004, and 38% of the
cases filed during 2005 were resolved through dismissal. Id. The data on dismissals for cases
filed in 2006 and 2007 is not included in the average cited by this article because motions to
dismiss have not yet been decided in many of these cases, resulting in a higher percentage of
continuing cases and a lower percentage of dismissals.
117 Id.
118 Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 21, at 116 n.94 (finding that seventy-two out of ninetyone motions were granted in full or in large part).
li9See Federal Justice Statistics Res. Ctr., http://fjsrc.urban.org/index.cfm. The data can
be selected for the following variables: (1) statistic, here "outcomes for defendants in cases
closed;" (2) year, here 2001 through 2006; and (3) type of charge, here 15 U.S.C. § 78j. In
2006, 17 of 108 securities fraud cases were terminated by dismissal or nolle prosequi. In
2005, 3 of 95 were terminated; in 2004, 8 of 57 were terminated; in 2003, 9 of 108 were
terminated; in 2002, 3 of 95 were terminated; and in 2001, 4 of 64 were terminated.
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The disparity in dismissal figures does not compel the conclusion
that the same allegations are more likely to proceed to trial in a
criminal case than in a civil case. Arguably, prosecutors in the
exercise of their discretion are less likely to pursue unmeritorious
claims than civil plaintiffs in a strike suit. Nonetheless, these
procedural differences, at the very least, intensify the substantive
differences addressed above, exacerbating the anomalous result in
which a defendant can be held criminally but not civilly liable for
the same conduct.
F. The Higher Mental State Generally Required for Criminal
Liability Does Not Cure the Anomaly.
The mental state required to establish criminal liability under
federal law is ostensibly higher than the mental state required to
establish civil liability. This difference, however, is unlikely to close
the gap between civil and criminal liability for conduct sounding in
securities fraud because essentially the same evidence is sufficient
in both contexts.
Civil securities fraud requires a showing of scienter, which is
ordinarily defined as "recklessness." 120 A reckless statement is one
'involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but
an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and
which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is
either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must
A few circuits require 'severe
have been aware of it.'121
122
or a 'high degree of recklessness."'' 123 If the
recklessness"'
allegedly false statement is forward-looking, the scienter
124
requirement is raised to "actual knowledge."
120 Miller v. Champion Enters., Inc., 346 F.3d 660, 672 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming that
"recklessness" is the state of mind required for securities fraud); In re Advanta Corp. Sec.
Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 535 (3d Cir. 1999) (affirming that "recklessness" is the state of mind
required for securities fraud); Heuer, Reese & Sale, supra note 79, at 964 ("The Seventh
Circuit has permitted a defendant's reckless action to meet the scienter requirement, and
most circuits have followed suit ...").
121 In re Advanta Corp., 180 F.3d at 535 (quoting McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190,
1197 (3d Cir. 1979)).
122 Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund v. Integrated Elec. Servs. Inc., 497 F.3d 546, 551 (5th Cir.
2007) (stating that scienter means "either intent or severe recklessness" (quoting Fin.
Acquisition Partners, L.P. v. Blackwell, 440 F.3d 278, 287 (5th Cir. 2006))).
123 Miss. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 523 F.3d 75, 85 (1st Cir.
2008) ("This circuit has held that a plaintiff can demonstrate scienter by showing that
defendants either 'consciously intended to defraud, or that they acted with a high degree of
recklessness."' (quoting Aldridge v. A.T. Cross Corp., 284 F.3d 72, 82 (1st Cir. 2002))).
124 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B)(i) (2000).
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Criminal securities fraud, on the other hand, requires a showing
of "willfulness." 12 5 Willfulness requires "intentionally undertaking
an act that one knows to be wrongful."'126 Mail and wire fraud,
similarly, require proof of the "specific intent to defraud." 127 The
specific intent to defraud has been defined as 'willful participation
in a scheme with knowledge of its fraudulent nature and with intent
that these illicit objectives be achieved," ' 128 as "conscious knowing
130
intent to defraud," 129 and as "reckless indifference."
Although the criminal mental states are more stringent than civil
scienter, this difference is diminished by the practicality of how a
defendant's mental state is proven at trial. Direct evidence of a
defendant's mental state is unusual; ordinarily, a person's mental
state must be inferred from indirect evidence. 1 3 1 Prosecutors,
therefore, use circumstantial evidence to prove that a defendant
possessed the requisite criminal mental state. 132 A defendant's
mens rea "may be inferred from the defendant's statements and
conduct," 13 3 "evidence of actual or contemplated harm,"134 "a
' 135
defendant's reckless indifference to the truth of a representation,"

125 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2000) (criminalizing "willful violations" of the securities laws);
Heuer, Reese & Sale, supra note 79, at 958-59 ("The only difference is that in order for
criminal liability to attach, a showing of willfulness is required in addition to the elements of
a civil claim under Rule 10b-5.").
126 United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1188 (9th Cir. 2004).
127 United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 339 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 2008 WL2307360
(2008) (holding that a mail fraud conviction requires the 'specific intent to defraud."' (quoting
United States v. Dotson, 407 F.3d 387, 391-92 (5th Cir. 2005))); United States v. Brown, 459
F.3d 509, 519 (5th Cir. 2006) ('Violation of the wire-fraud statute requires the specific intent
to defraud .... ); United States v. Manion, 339 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
in order to convict of mail or wire fraud the government must "show specific intent to
defraud").
12s Manion, 339 F.3d at 1156 (quoting United States v. Price, 623 F.2d 587, 591 (9th Cir.
1980), overruled by United States v. DeBright, 730 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1984)).
129 Brown, 459 F.3d at 519 (quoting United States v. Reyes, 239 F.3d 722, 736 (5th Cir.
2001)).
130 See CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 29, § 9-1520 (instructing that
"[f]raudulent intent is shown if a representation is made with reckless indifference to its truth
or falsity").
131 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193,
1221 (1985) ("Unless the criminal defendant confesses or makes damaging admissions, his
state of mind has to be inferred from external acts .... ").
132 Heuer, Reese & Sale, supra note 79, at 996 ("[Slome cases suggest that the
government's burden of proving intent may be met using only circumstantial evidence.")
(compiling cases); CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 29, § 9-1520 (instructing that
fraudulent intent may be inferred).
133 United States v. Sayakhom, 186 F.3d 928, 941 (9th Cir. 1999).
134 United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081, 1105 (10th Cir. 2003).
135 Id.; see also United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1189 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding
"that recklessness is adequate to support a conviction for securities fraud" and that this
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"misrepresentations made by the defendants, and the scheme
itself."136 It is unlikely, therefore, that a cognizable difference exists
between the proof needed to prove criminal intent and the proof
needed to satisfy civil scienter.1 3 7 Moreover, in light of the PSLRA's
heightened pleading standards for scienter, which require a civil
plaintiff to "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind,"1 38 it is arguable that the scienter bar in civil cases is actually
higher than the mens rea bar in criminal cases.
Indeed, defendants charged with criminal securities fraud have
found the purportedly higher criminal mental state to be of little
comfort. Juries are comfortable convicting defendants of fraud
based on circumstantial evidence that directly conflicts with the
defendants' testimony on the witness stand. For example, despite
denying "playing any role in the $11 billion accounting fraud at the
telecommunications company," WorldCom CEO Bernard Ebbers
was convicted of fraud.1 39 Likewise, despite testifying that
[t]he last thing I would do is step back in as CEO and pick up
leadership of a conspiracy, having lived my whole life in such
a way to make sure that I was doing at least what I thought,
according to my moral code of conduct and according to my
1 40
religious faith, was right or wrong,
Enron CEO Kenneth Lay was convicted of securities and wire
fraud. 141

standard is consistent with the definition of "willful").
136 United States v. Sullivan, 522 F.3d 967, 974 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
137 Heuer, Reese & Sale, supra note 79, at 966 ("It is debatable whether willfulness in
criminal cases requires something above the ordinary scienter required in civil cases.");
Carole B. Silver, Penalizing Insider Trading: A CriticalAssessment of the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1984, 1985 DUKE L.J. 960, 1021 (1985) (recognizing "the possible anomaly
that the same degree of culpability applies in both criminal actions ... and civil actions"
(emphasis omitted)).
138 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000); Southland Secs. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365
F.3d 353, 362-63 (5th Cir. 2004) ("The PSLRA reinforces the particularity requirements of
Rule 9(b), requiring the plaintiffs to state not only the time, place, the identity of the speaker,
and the content of the alleged misrepresentation, but also to explain why the challenged
statement or omission is false or misleading.").
139MCI-WorldCom Timeline, 1983-Present, FOXNEwS.COM,
Mar.
15, 2005,
http://foxnews.com/story/0,2933,150521,00.html (reporting that, on February 28, 2005, former
WorldCom CEO Bernard Ebbers took the witness stand and denied any role in the fraud and
that, on March 1, 2005, Ebbers was found guilty of fraud).
140 Transcript of Testimony of Kenneth Lay, United States v. Causey, 356 F. Supp. 2d 681
(S.D.
Tex.
2006)
(No.
H-04-25),
available
at
http://www.chron.com/news/specials/enron/background.html
(follow "Pain of Bankruptcy"
hyperlink).
141 See
A
Timeline
of
the
Rise
&
Fall
of
Enron,
CHRON.COM,
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III. DIFFERING CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TREATMENT OF CONDUCT
SOUNDING IN SECURITIES FRAUD MAY AFFECT THE CURRENT
SCHEME OF SECURITIES REGULATION.

The current scheme of securities regulation reflects a delicate
balance among numerous considerations.
The imposition of
criminal punishment for conduct that does not invoke civil liability
risks disrupting this balance, potentially at the expense of
considerations deemed important by Congress and the courts.
A. The Wire/Mail FraudRun-Around May Disrupt the Balance
Between Honest Markets and Optimal Levels of Disclosure.
When adopting the objective materiality standard for securities
fraud,
the
Supreme
Court balanced
several competing
considerations. On the one hand, the Supreme Court recognized the
fundamental importance of fair and honest markets. 142
The
Supreme Court identified "honest publicity" as an essential tool to
prevent manipulation and dishonest market practices. 14 3 This
consideration weighed in favor of a low standard of materialityboth to lower the bar for required disclosures and to limit the
number of affirmative false statements. On the other hand, the
Supreme Court recognized the dangers of setting the materiality
standard too low. When applied to omissions by a company, "a
minimal standard might bring an overabundance of information
within its reach, and lead management 'simply to bury the
shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information-a result that is
hardly conducive to informed decisionmaking.' 144 The Supreme
Court adopted an objective materiality standard designed to achieve

http://www.chron.comlnews/specials/enron/timeline (last visited Nov. 30, 2008) (web version of
the Houston Chronicle). Because Lay died before his appeals were exhausted, his conviction
was vacated on October 17, 2006. Id.
142 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (recognizing that a central purpose of
the securities laws is "to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices"); see also 15
U.S.C. § 78b (2000) (stating that one purpose of securities regulation is "to insure the
maintenance of fair and honest markets").
143 Basic, 485 U.S. at 230 ('There cannot be honest markets without honest publicity."'
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 11 (1934))); see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 195 (1976) (stating that the purpose of the securities law is "to provide investors with full
disclosure of material information concerning public offerings of securities in commerce, to
protect investors against fraud and, through the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to
promote ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing").
144 Basic, 485 U.S. at 231 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 44849 (1976)).
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a delicate balance between these competing concerns to protect the
integrity of the markets and to encourage the appropriate level of
145
disclosure.
The importance of the balance achieved by the materiality
standard has been widely acknowledged. In fact, the necessity of
preserving the materiality balance spurred Congress to amend the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO").
Prior to the passage of the PSLRA, plaintiffs could premise civil
RICO claims sounding in securities fraud on violations of the mail
and wire fraud statutes-thus avoiding the more stringent
requirements of a securities fraud claim. 146 This run-around was
widely criticized.
For example, Justice Thurgood Marshall
recognized that the use of civil RICO to pursue claims sounding in
securities fraud "virtually eliminates decades of legislative and
judicial development of private civil remedies under the federal
securities laws.' 1 47 Justice Marshall identified materiality as one of
the crucial issues that RICO allowed plaintiffs to bypass. 148 The
PSLRA closed this door by prohibiting civil RICO claims from being
premised on claims that sound in securities fraud. 149 Although the
same argument ostensibly applies in the criminal context, Congress
left the wire/mail fraud run-around open to prosecutors.
The lower materiality standard available via the wire/mail fraud
run-around risks disrupting the delicate balance achieved with the
objective materiality standard. 50 The goal of encouraging fair and
honest markets is furthered at the expense of the goal of achieving

Id. at 249.
See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 47 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) ("[With this amendment], the
Conference Committee intends that a plaintiff may not plead other specified offenses, such as
mail or wire fraud, as predicate acts under civil RICO if such offenses are based on conduct
that would have been actionable as securities fraud.").
147 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 505 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
148 Id.
("All of this law is now an endangered species because plaintiffs can avoid the
limitations of the securities laws merely by alleging violations of other predicate acts.").
149 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000) ("[N]o person may rely upon any conduct that would have
been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to establish a violation of section
1962.").
150 The current materiality standard also achieves a delicate balance between encouraging
and discouraging private class actions. An objective materiality standard simultaneously
enables and limits private securities class actions. On the one hand, the objective standard
permits classwide determination of materiality. On the other hand, the standard bars suit by
unreasonable or gullible investors. Margaret V. Sachs, Materiality and Social Change: The
Case for Replacing "The Reasonable Investor" with "The Least Sophisticated Investor" in
Inefficient Markets, 81 TUL. L. REV. 473, 486-89 (2006) (detailing how the objective
materiality standard embodies these conflicting mindsets). This balance is not upset by the
wire/mail fraud run-around, which does not affect private class actions.
145

146
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the appropriate amount of disclosure.
The lower materiality
standard compels disclosure of objectively unimportant details of a
corporate event, flooding the market with too much information. By
the same token, the lower materiality standard inhibits corporate
executives from making voluntary statements to analysts and
investors, for fear that their offhand remarks could form the basis of
a wire fraud indictment.151
The chilling effect of the lower
materiality standard is compounded by the overdeterrence effect of
152
criminal liability, which discourages even borderline behavior.
In other words, the wire/mail fraud run-around risks changing
the entire scheme of corporate disclosure. 15 3 Already, attorneys
caution their corporate clients that "[s]lips of the [t]ongue and [p]en
[a]re [d]angerous."' 154 In light of the wire/mail fraud run-around,
corporate counsel should warn their clients that off-the-cuff remarks
risk imprisonment. The current editions of the National Investor
55
Relations Institute's Standards of Practicefor Investor Relations
and the Practicing Law Institute's Policy Statement Concerning
Disclosure of Material Information continue to define materiality as
an objective standard, 156 but these corporate handbooks should be
amended to reflect the subjective materiality standard compelled by
the wire/mail fraud run-around.

151Hoffman, supra note 20, at 599-600 (recognizing the relationship between a strict
materiality standard and corporate disclosure and, based on the strength of the immateriality
doctrine in civil litigation, predicting increased corporate disclosure).
152 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 224 (4th ed. 1992) ("[A] savage
penalty will induce people to forgo socially desirable activities at the borderline of criminal
activity."); Coffee, supra note 45, at 9 (recognizing that the liberal construction of criminal
laws influences "risk averse citizens who change their behavior to stay comfortably distant
from a vague, shifting line"); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal
Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 14 (1990) ("High criminal penalties
will deter people from desirable, but only marginally lawful, activity because they are
uncertain whether they will be convicted of a crime.").
153 Michael R. Dreeben, now a Deputy Solicitor General in the Office of the Solicitor
General, U.S. Department of Justice, recognized a comparable risk in the use of the
"intangible rights doctrine" of mail fraud to prosecute corporate officers for failing to disclose
information to the public shareholders, despite the fact that the securities laws may not have
required the disclosure. Michael R. Dreeben, Insider Trading and Intangible Rights: The
Redefinition of the Mail FraudStatute, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 181, 190-91 (1988). Mr. Dreeben
noted that this application of the mail fraud statute "came at the expense of the securities law
policies that Congress, the SEC, and the courts had developed to structure the behavior of
corporate officers and directors." Id. at 191.
154 Wander, supra note 55, at 846.
155 NAT'L INVESTOR RELATIONS INST., STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR INVESTOR RELATIONS
22 (3d ed. 2004) (premising disclosure requirements on a statement's materiality, as
objectively defined under the securities laws).
156 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE, PREPARATION OF ANNUAL
DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS 2008, 648-49 (2008) (defining materiality as an objective standard).
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B. The Wire/Mail FraudRun-Around May Affect What Information
Investors Rely Upon When Making Investment Decisions.
A key assumption underlying the securities fraud materiality
standard is that stock purchasers
expect a company's
representatives to make puffing statements and thus lend them no
credence. 157 In other words, it is assumed that "reasonable"
investors disregard some statements by corporate officers.
Of
course, this assumption is self-perpetuating. Presumably, one of the
reasons that reasonable investors discount puffing statements is
their understanding that these types of statements cannot support a
securities fraud claim.
The use of a subjective materiality standard to prosecute
corporate officers for wire or mail fraud may encourage investors to
lend credence to vague statements of corporate optimism,
undercutting the assumption that investors disregard puffery.
Recognizing that corporate officers can face imprisonment for a false
statement of corporate optimism, investors may begin to take every
statement-even a puffing one-at face value.
In effect, the
prosecution of corporate officers for puffery could create a class of
investors who make investment decisions on the basis of vague
statements of corporate optimism rather than on statements of fact.
In addition to increasing market volatility, this new class of
"gullible" investors could transform the meaning of materiality in
the securities fraud context. Arguably, these investors-by taking
into account the criminal disincentive facing corporate officers who
make false statements of optimism-would be making an objectively
reasonable decision to rely on corporate puffery. If courts were to
accept this argument, even a vague statement of optimism by a
corporate officer could form the basis for civil securities liability. In
other words, the objective materiality standard would become
coextensive with the subjective standard. As a result, the delicate
balance achieved by the objective materiality definition would be
disrupted, chilling voluntary disclosure and encouraging the
flooding of the market with trivial information.
One commentator has suggested, however, that retail investors
(as opposed to institutional investors) already rely on puffery when
making investment decisions, that these retail investors are being

157 O'Hare, supra note 13, at 1721 (identifying "distrust between the buyer and the seller"
as an assumption underlying the puffery defense).
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driven out of the markets because of the disfavored treatment that
they receive under the civil securities laws, and that this is
adversely affecting market liquidity.'5 8
Under this analysis,
lowering the securities fraud materiality standard to include puffery
would achieve the positive effects of encouraging retail investment
and improving market liquidity.
C. The Criminalizationof Conduct Not Civilly Actionable May
Transfer Enforcement Responsibility Away from the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
"The SEC is vested with primary responsibility for enforcing the
[Securities Exchange] Act and protecting the public interest."'1 9 In
this role, the SEC's mission "is to protect investors, maintain fair,
160
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation."'
As such, the SEC has developed unique expertise in the securities
field.' 61 The anomaly of criminalizing conduct not civilly actionable
may, however, jeopardize the SEC's primacy. The wire/mail fraud
run-around may transfer enforcement responsibility away from the
SEC to the DOJ, and expansive state securities statutes may
transfer enforcement responsibility away from the SEC to the
individual states.
First, the wire/mail fraud run-around, which is only available in
criminal cases, is out of the SEC's reach. The SEC institutes civil
securities fraud enforcement proceedings, while the DOJ institutes
criminal prosecutions. The SEC may "in its discretion" refer a
matter to the DOJ for prosecution, 162 but the DOJ has independent
discretion to prosecute without SEC referral or to refrain from
prosecution despite SEC referral. 163 As a consequence, the
availability of the wire/mail fraud run-around shifts enforcement
158 Jennifer O'Hare, Retail Investor Remedies under Rule 10B-5, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 521,
539, 552-54 (2008).
159 Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 226 F. Supp. 400, 406 (N.D. Ill. 1964); SEC.

EXCH. COMM'N, THE INVESTOR'S ADVOCATE: HOW THE SEC PROTECTS INVESTORS, MAINTAINS
MARKET
INTEGRITY,
AND
FACILITATES
CAPITAL
FORMATION
(2008),

http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (describing the SEC as "the primary overseer and
regulator of the U.S. securities markets").
160 SEC. EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 159.
161 Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 64 (1977) (recognizing the SEC's expertise
in the securities field).
162 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (2008).
163 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(f) (2008) (recognizing that the Attorney General and the Department
of Justice have "the authority and responsibility for instituting, conducting, settling, or
otherwise disposing of criminal proceedings"); Heuer, Reese & Sale, supra note 79, at 1015.
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responsibility from the SEC to the DOJ. The Supreme Court
recognized this enforcement policy consideration in United States v.
O'Hagan.16 4 The Court considered whether criminal liability under
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act could be based on the
misappropriation theory of insider trading. 165 The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals, refusing to recognize the misappropriation theory,
had reversed both the securities fraud counts and the accompanying
mail fraud counts because "the indictment was structured in such a
manner as to premise the fraud for the mail fraud charges on the
acts allegedly constituting the securities fraud."'166 On appeal, the
Supreme Court upheld the misappropriation theory, thus mooting
the issue of whether reversal of the securities fraud conviction
necessitated reversal of the mail fraud conviction. 167 The majority
nonetheless briefly discussed the enforcement considerations
implicated by this issue: "[i]f misappropriation theory cases could
proceed only under the federal mail and wire fraud
statutes,... 'proportionally more persons accused of insider trading
[might] be pursued by a U.S. Attorney, and proportionally fewer by
the SEC."' 168 Justice Clarence Thomas, in dissent, rejected the
misappropriation theory of securities fraud, but stated that the
conduct could nonetheless be prosecuted as mail fraud. 169 Justice
Thomas disregarded the enforcement considerations raised by the
170
majority as "no business of this Court."
Second, the breadth of civil and criminal enforcement under the
state securities statutes-often exceeding the scope of the federal
securities laws-may shift enforcement responsibility away from
the SEC to the individual states. For example, the Attorney

521 U.S. 642 (1997).
Id. at 647.
166 United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 627 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
17' OHagan, 521 U.S. at 647.
168 Id. at 678 n.25 (citing and quoting Barbara Bader Aldave, The Misappropriation
Theory: Carpenter and Its Aftermath, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 373, 381-82 (1988)). Ten years earlier,
in Carpenterv. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), the Supreme Court was confronted with a
similar case in which the defendants were convicted of securities fraud based on the
misappropriation theory and of mail and wire fraud premised on the same conduct. The
Court, which was evenly divided on the viability of the misappropriation theory, affirmed the
conviction for securities fraud, and-without analyzing the interaction of the securities fraud
statute and the wire and mail fraud statutes-affirmed the convictions for wire and mail
fraud. Id. at 24-28.
169 O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 700-01 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[J]ust because those facts are
legally insufficient to constitute securities fraud does not make them legally insufficient to
constitute mail fraud.").
170 Id. at 701 n.13 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
164
165
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General of New York, exploiting the breadth of the Martin Act,
achieved a landmark settlement with Merrill Lynch to prevent
analyst conflicts of interest. 171 Theoretically, every state attorney
general, if afforded the statutory tools, could force a company to
enter into a separate settlement agreement, with the result that the
companies would be required to comply with fifty different
standards. 172 This effect, the so-called "Balkanization" of securities
regulation, 173 has been widely decried as usurping the power of the
SEC, 17 4 preventing uniformity, 175 and undermining market
1 76
efficiency.
As a practical matter, however, commentators have noted that
state enforcement agencies are generally working together with the
SEC and with each other to achieve consistency and prevent
duplication of efforts. 177 In addition, the tremendous resources
required to investigate and prosecute a large-scale securities fraud
case are often beyond the reach of individual states, and these cases
therefore default to the federal government. For example, during
the course of its investigation, the Enron Task Force examined

171 Agreement between the Attorney General of the State of New York and Merrill Lynch,
Pierce,
Fenner
&
Smith,
Inc.,
May
21,
2002,
available
at
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.comhdocs/docs/merrilllynch/nymerril152102agr.pdf;
Christopher R. Lane, Halting the March Toward Preemption: Resolving Conflicts Between
State and Federal Securities Regulators, 39 NEw ENG. L. REV. 317, 330-31 (2005) (detailing
the events surrounding the Merrill Lynch settlement).
172 Michael G. Oxley, Letter to the Editor, 9%o Should Police the FinancialMarkets?, N.Y.
TIMES, June 9, 2002, § 3, at 11 (predicting that "every Wall Street firm would have to cut its
private deal with every state attorney general or face the potential threat of fraud charges").
173 Steve A. Radom, Balkanization of Securities Regulation: The Case for Federal
Preemption, 39 TEX. J. BUS. L. 295, 304 (2003) ("Balkanization refers to the process of political
fragmentation, effectuated by breaking up regulatory bodies into smaller, and often hostile,
units.").
174 Jonathan R. Macey, Positive Political Theory and Federal Usurpation of the Regulation
of Corporate Governance: The Coming Preemption of the Martin Act, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
951, 952 (2005) (describing the New York Attorney General as having launched "a 'hostile
takeover' of the SEC" (quoting Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street in Turmoil: State-Federal
Relations Post-Eliot Spitzer, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 117, 128-133 (2005))).
175 Mathiesen, supra note 82, at 313 (questioning whether Balkanization will "wreck the
uniform federal scheme with parochial reforms crafted only for their populist ring").
176 Lane, supra note 170, at 339 (recognizing the risk that fifty different requirements
would "impair the efficiency of the markets").
177 Mathiesen, supra note 82, at 322-23 (detailing the coordination among the New York
Attorney General, the New York Stock Exchange, the National Association of Securities
Dealers, and the SEC to reach a "Global Settlement" to prevent analyst conflicts of interest);
Dale A. Oesterle, Early Observations on the Prosecutionsof the Business Scandals of 2002-03:
On Sideshow Prosecutions, Spitzer's Clash with Donaldson Over Turf, the Choice of Civil or
Criminal Actions, and the Tough Tactic of Coerced Cooperation, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 443,
469 (2004) (explaining how the attorneys general in ten states divided responsibility for
investigating analyst conflicts of interest).
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"more than four terabytes of data-equal to about [twenty] percent
178
of all the information stored in the Library of Congress."
D. The Inapplicabilityof the Safe Harbor to CriminalLiability May
DiscourageForward-LookingStatements.
Congress intended for the PSLRA's safe harbor for forwardlooking statements to encourage corporate executives to make
predictions. Congress recognized: "Fear that inaccurate projections
will trigger the filing of a securities fraud lawsuit has muzzled
corporate management."' 17 9 The safe harbor was meant to allay this
fear.180 Of course, unacknowledged by Congress is that fear of
criminal liability is likely to muzzle corporate management even
more effectively than the threat of a civil lawsuit. For this reason,
the indictment of corporate executives for inaccurate projections is
likely to counteract the calming effect of the safe harbor.
E. The PotentialExposure to CriminalAiding and Abetting
Liability May DiscourageProfessionalsfrom Advising New
Companies.
In Central Bank, the Supreme Court recognized that uncertainty
about the scope of aiding and abetting liability could have ripple
effects in the economy.18 1 The Court warned that less established
companies might have trouble finding professionals willing to
tender their services and that the price of professional servicestaking into account the professional's risk of potential aiding and
abetting liability if the company were to fail-might render them
out of reach.1 8 2 The Court recently reiterated these concerns with
18 3
private aiding and abetting liability.
Allan Sloan, Laying Enron to Rest, NEWSWEEK, June 5, 2006, at 25.
S. REP. No. 104-98, at 16 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 695.
180 Id. at 5 ("The mere specter of 10b-5 liability, however, has become more than a
deterrent to fraud. Private securities class actions under 10b-5 inhibit free and open
communication among management, analysts, and investors. This has caused corporate
management to refrain from providing shareholders forward-looking information about
companies."); Id. at 9 ('Many companies refuse to talk or write about future business plans,
knowing that projections that fail to materialize will inevitably result in a lawsuit.").
181 Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 189 (1994).
182 Id.
("[N]ewer and smaller companies may find it difficult to obtain advice from
professionals. A professional may fear that a newer or smaller company may not survive and
that business failure would generate securities litigation against the professional ...").
183 Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 772 (2008)
(noting that the potential uncertainty surrounding aiding and abetting liability could raise
the cost of business and deter overseas firms from doing business in the United States).
178

179
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These same concerns are implicated-perhaps even intensifiedby the potential of criminal aiding and abetting liability. Securities
professionals may fear that, if a company to whom they have
provided services were to fail, they would be at risk of criminal
liability. This apprehension may deter professionals from providing
services to emerging companies or may compel them to charge
prohibitively high prices, both with the effect of stifling the
economy. In addition, secondary actors may feel compelled, beyond
their ordinary duties, to "monitor public statements made by others,
thus straining the economy."'18 4
F. The Breadth of Conduct Within the Scope of the CriminalLaws
May Afford Prosecutors Undue Discretion.
The criminalization of conduct outside the scope of the civil
securities laws, such as the making of false statements that are
either objectively immaterial or forward-looking, affords prosecutors
broad discretion to decide whether to prosecute a corporate
executive. Every corporate executive who makes an optimistic
statement or rosy prediction is potentially subject to prosecution if
the company's stock later takes a downward turn. The virtual
unavailability of pretrial motion practice to weed out unmeritorious
claims strengthens the prosecutor's power to prosecute borderline
conduct.
This broad prosecutorial discretion has several
ramifications.
First, the strategy of overcriminalizing conduct and allowing
prosecutors to choose who is "deserving" of prosecution is an
uninspiring rationale for criminal liability.18 5 When two actors in
the same position are treated differently-one vilified as a criminal
and the other permitted to remain in society-it undermines
6
society's justification for imprisonment.18
Second, the separation of powers doctrine is implicated when
Congress enacts such broad statutes that it essentially abdicates its
legislative role, allowing prosecutors and the courts to decide what
184 Brief Amicus Curiae for Defense Research Institute in Support of Respondents at 2,
Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2329636.
185Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing CorporateMisconduct, 60 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 60 (1997) ('Criminalize them all and let prosecutors sort them out' is
not a particularly inspiring slogan for a penal code.").
186 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401,
424 (1958) (rejecting as an "arrogant assertion" the idea that "it is proper to visit the moral
condemnation of the community upon one of its members on the basis solely of the private
judgment of his prosecutors").
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conduct to criminalize. The separation of powers limits judicial
review of prosecutors' discretion.18 7 By the same token, however,
the separation of powers also limits prosecutors' ability to usurp the
legislature.
When Congress overcriminalizes,
prosecutors
appropriate Congress's law-making functions. The executive branch
decides which conduct to prosecute and which to ignore-without
any of the public hearings, vigorous debate, or democratic process of
the legislative branch.1 88 For example, likely because of the breadth
of the mail and wire fraud statutes, the DOJ has an official
prosecution policy to avoid prosecuting schemes that "consisto of
some isolated transactions between individuals, involving minor
loss to the victims" and to focus on "any scheme which in its nature
is directed to defrauding a class of persons, or the general public,
with a substantial pattern of conduct."'1 9 To the extent that courts
are asked to decide whether conduct is within the scope of a broad,
vague statute, the judicial branch-also without the hallmarks of
the legislative process-performs legislative functions. 190
Finally, this broad discretion allows prosecutors to make
prosecution decisions based on improper factors such as "race, class,
or ethnicity." 191 Moreover, especially relevant in the white collar

187 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (characterizing the decision to
prosecute as "a 'special province' of the Executive" (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,
832 (1985))); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) ("[T]he decision to prosecute is
particularly ill-suited to judicial review."); Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation
in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 19 (2008) ('The Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that prosecutors' decisions as to whether or not to file criminal charges are generally
unreviewable by the courts."); Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Power, Discretion,
and Misconduct, 23 CRIM. JUST. 24, 28 (2008) ("Courts have consistently deferred to the
expertise of prosecutors in declining to question their motives for charging and other
important prosecutorial decisions.").
188 Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to
Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 179 (1994) ("When prosecutors select cases
according to their own agendas of social control, bureaucratic necessity, or personal
advancement, lawmaking devolves to law enforcers."); Michael P. Murphy, Note, "Of" as a
Loaded Word: Congress Tests the Boundaries of Its Commerce Power with an Amendment to
the Federal Murder-for-Hire Statute, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1375, 1398 (2005)
("Congressional abnegation of its authority to dictate the criminal law menu by establishing a
generous buffet of criminal law from which federal prosecutors may freely choose threatens
the system of checks and balances by effectively transferring power to establish priorities in
criminal law to the executive branch.").
189 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-43.100 (1997).
190 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 n.7 (1983) ("It would certainly be dangerous if
the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the
courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large.
This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of
government."' (quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876))).
191 Erik Luna, The OvercriminalizationPhenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 726 (2005).
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crime context, broad prosecutorial discretion allows the executive
branch to prosecute defendants in response to political pressure and
public outcry. For example, during the Congressional hearings on
the Enron collapse and bankruptcy, the company's top executives
were called, variously, "the most accomplished confidence man since
Charles Ponzi,"192 "a carnival barker,"' 93 and an "economic
terroristU." 194 In this atmosphere, the Enron Task Force faced
"pressure to deliver" 195 and eventually succeeded in indicting thirty196
four defendants.
G. The Criminalizationof Conduct Not Civilly Actionable Affords
the SEC Remarkable Leverage in Negotiating Civil Settlements.
SEC enforcement actions forge a middle ground between the
breadth of criminal liability and the narrowness of private civil
liability. As in a criminal case, the safe harbor for forward-looking
statement is unavailable in SEC enforcement proceedings, the SEC
may pursue aider and abettors in addition to primary violators, and
197
the stringent pleading requirements of the PSLRA do not apply.
As in a private civil action, however, the wire/mail fraud run-around
is unavailable to the SEC because the SEC institutes only civil
proceedings, and defendants can draw on the civil tradition of filing
motions to dismiss.1 98 In sum, the gap between criminal liability
and SEC enforcement liability is smaller than the gap between
criminal liability and private civil liability, but the gap nonetheless
exists.
The breadth of potential criminal liability increases the pressure
on a defendant under SEC investigation to reach a settlement with
the SEC, even if the defendant has strong defenses to liability. The
SEC is explicitly authorized to refer matters to the DOJ for

192 Collapse of Enron: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and Transp., 107th
Cong. 4 (2002) (statement of Sen. Peter Fitzgerald), available at 2002 WL 219196.
193

Id.

The Financial Collapse of Enron-Part2: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight
and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 16 (2002)
(statement of Rep. Bobby L. Rush), available at 2002 WL 193684.
195 Edward Iwata, Enron Task Force Faces Big Pressure to Deliver, USA TODAY, Aug. 21,
2002, at 1B, availableat 2002 WLNR 4499099.
196 The
Fall
of
Enron:
Prosecution
Scorecard,
CHRON.COM,
http://www.chron.com/news/specials/enron/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2008) (showing thirty-four
criminal defendants).
197 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (2008).
198 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A) (2006).
194
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prosecution 99 and to transmit evidence that it has gathered to the
DOJ.20 0 As a result, the SEC and the DOJ routinely work together
on investigations, 2 1 and the prospect of criminal indictment is often
20 2
used as leverage to convince a defendant to agree to a settlement.
This "good cop/bad cop" tactic is extremely effective in achieving
cooperation from the defendant. The threat, implicit or explicit, of
criminal indictment, coupled with the reality that it is in many
ways easier to criminally convict a defendant than to hold him
civilly liable in an enforcement action, can render settlement with
the SEC irresistible, even in cases where the SEC is overreaching.
H. The Narrow Scope of Private Civil Liability Leaves Injured
Investors Uncompensated.

As a consequence of the narrow scope of private civil liability,
investors who are injured by criminally actionable conduct are often
uncompensated. For example, the following investors are generally
without civil remedy: (1) investors who make investment decisions
based on false, but objectively immaterial, statements; 20 3 (2)
investors who make investment decisions based on false forwardlooking statements that are accompanied by meaningful cautionary
199 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (2008).
15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (2006); David H. Kistenbroker, Pamela G.
Smith, David S. Slovick & Alyx S. Pattison, Criminal and Civil Investigations:United States
v. Stein and Related Issues, in SECURITIES LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2006 483,
504 (Practising Law Institute 2006) (noting that "the United States Attorney may reap the
rewards of the SEC's labor by building a criminal case based almost entirely on the fruits of
the SEC's civil investigation").
201 In fact, the Ninth Circuit recently held that, as long as the SEC has generally warned a
defendant that information received in the course of an investigation might be shared with
the DOJ and has not affirmatively stated that it is not sharing information with the DOJ, the
SEC may funnel the gathered evidence to the DOJ during the investigation without informing
the defendant. United States v. Stringer, 535 F.3d 929, 938, 940-41 (9th Cir. 2008).
202 Geraldine Szott Moohr, What the Martha Stewart Case Tells Us About White Collar
Criminal Law, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 591, 601 (2006) ("[T]he threat of criminal charges obviously
strengthens the government's position in negotiations over the civil matter."); Mary Jo White,
The Current Enforcement Environment: The Best of Times/The Worst of Times-Can We
Reach A Reasonable Middle Ground?, in 2 36TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES
REGULATION 997, 1008 (Practising Law Institute 2004) ("[Clompanies feel tremendous
pressure to settle with the SEC or Attorney General on the civil side on terms they consider
far beyond fair in order to lift the crushing weight and adverse publicity of long-running
parallel civil and criminal investigations, as well as the threat of a company-threatening
indictment."); Christian Babich, Comment, ParallelProceedings: The Government's DoubleTeam Approach and the Degradationof ConstitutionalProtections, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
753, 754 (2007) ("It has become common practice in corporate fraud investigations for the
SEC to induce 'full cooperation' by implicitly or explicitly promising to mitigate civil and
criminal liability.").
203 See supra text accompanying notes 9-31.
200
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language; 20 4 (3) investors defrauded by insolvent primary
violators; 20 5 and (4) defrauded investors who are unable to plead
their case with the requisite specificity without the benefit of
206
discovery.
The possibility that the SEC might distribute to injured investors
disgorgement and penalties that it has collected, although not
"toothless,"' 20 7 is of little comfort to injured investors. The receipt of
any compensation depends on numerous factors, including-most
importantly-whether the SEC decides to pursue an enforcement
208
action.
The compensation of injured investors is not, however, a central
goal of the securities acts, and the absence of compensation for
certain investors does not necessarily impede the purposes of the
securities acts. The securities acts were enacted to "insure the
maintenance of fair and honest markets" 20 9 and "to protect
investors." 2 10 In order to accomplish these goals, the acts promote
"full disclosure of information thought necessary to informed
investment decisions." 211 Full disclosure is mandated by the acts,
and the enforcement mechanisms ensure compliance with the acts'
mandates.
Consistent with these goals, the implied private right of action for
securities fraud is primarily useful as a tool for deterrence.
Together with the acts' other enforcement mechanisms, it ensures
compliance with the acts' mandates. The private right of action has
a side benefit of compensating investors, but that is not its central
purpose. For example, Senators Paul Sarbanes, Barbara Boxer, and
Richard Bryan, who strongly support the extension of private civil
liability to aiders and abettors, crafted their argument in terms of
its deterrence value, not its potential for compensating investors:
See supra text accompanying notes 49-61.
See supra text accompanying notes 62-73.
206 See supra text accompanying notes 101-07.
207 Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 773 (2008).
208 See 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2006) (creating a "fair fundo for investors").
209 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006).
210 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2006); SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953).
211 Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 124; see also Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 171 (1994) ('Together, the Acts 'embrace a fundamental
purpose ... to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor."'
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
151 (1972))); S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683
("During the Great Depression, Congress enacted the 1933 and 1934 Acts to promote investor
confidence in the United States securities markets and thereby to encourage the investment
necessary for capital formation, economic growth, and job creation.").
204
205
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"[T]he deterrent effect of the securities laws would be strengthened
if aiding and abetting liability were restored in private actions as
well."2 12 Similarly, when recently reiterating that private civil
liability extends only to primary violators, the Supreme Court
emphasized the strong deterrent effect of SEC enforcement and
213
criminal liability.
Therefore, as recognized by the Supreme Court in Central Bank,
it would not necessarily follow from an expansion of private civil
liability to compensate additional injured investors that "the
objectives of the statute [would be] better served." 2 14 If the potential
of criminal liability and SEC enforcement were sufficient to ensure
compliance with the acts' mandates, 2 15 the expansion of the private
right of action would not necessarily advance the statutes' objectives
and, in fact, might hinder those objectives by stifling "efficiency,
216
competition, and capital formation."
IV. THEORIES ABOUT THE CIVIL-CRIMINAL DIVIDE EXPLAIN SOME
COMPONENTS OF THE DIFFERING CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TREATMENT
OF CONDUCT SOUNDING IN SECURITIES FRAUD.

In addition to disrupting the current scheme of securities
regulation, the anomaly of criminalizing conduct that sounds in
securities fraud but is not civilly actionable undercuts an
assumption underlying current scholarship on the civil-criminal
divide. The two leading theories about the civil-criminal divideone based on an economic analysis of the law and the other based on
moral considerations-assume that criminal liability is a subset of
civil liability in circumstances in which the relevant conduct has
identifiable individual victims. Applying the reasoning underlying
these theories to conduct sounding in securities fraud, however,
explains some aspects of the differing civil and criminal treatment
of this unique conduct.
A. The Current Scholarship on the Civil-CriminalDivide Assumes
212 SEN. REP. No. 104-98, at 49 (Additional Views of Senators Sarbanes, Boxer, and Bryan,
included with S. REP. No. 104-98, at 36-50).
213 Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 128 S. Ct. 761, 773 (2008).
214 Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 188.
215 Of course, whether the potential of criminal liability and SEC enforcement are, in fact,
sufficient deterrence is a separate issue.
216 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2006) (instructing the SEC, when it is engaged in rulemaking, to
consider the protection of investors and "whether the action will promote efficiency,
competition, and capital formation").
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That Civil Liability Is More Expansive than Criminal Liability.
As recognized by scholars on the civil-criminal divide, including
219
2 1s
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, 217 Richard A. Posner, Steven Shavell,
John Coffee, 220 Stephen Marks, 221 and Paul H. Robinson, 222 criminal
liability is ordinarily a subset of civil liability in instances where the
Some civilly
relevant conduct injures identifiable individuals.
actionable conduct is so wrongful that it is also a crime. If criminal
conduct involves a mens rea and an identifiable victim, the conduct
is usually also civilly actionable. This relationship between civil
and criminal liability is supported by the general rationale that
criminal sanctions are more severe than civil liability. In other
words, "conviction for crime is a distinctive and serious matter-a
something, and not a nothing." 223 For this reason, criminal liability
217 Dau-Schmidt, supra note 152, at 23 & n.108 ("[Ailmost all crimes are also torts.... The
most common exception is crimes that are merely malum prohibitum and crimes, such as
attempts, in which there is no actual harm." (emphasis omitted)).
218 Posner, supra note 131, at 1199 ("All of the pure coercive transfers that I have
discussed are intentional torts at common law; and the subset of intentional torts that
consists of pure coercive transfers (not all intentional torts are such) represents the largest
category of criminal acts.").
219 Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a
Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1240 (1985) ("There are, of course, several areas other
than that of unintentional torts where monetary sanctions but not imprisonment are
employed: intentional torts either that cannot be punished under the criminal law, such as
defamation, or that the state often decides not to prosecute criminally, such as assault and
battery; and acts punished by fines only, including many violations of tax, business, and
driving regulations.").
220 John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law
Models-And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1887 (1992) [hereinafter
Coffee, Paradigms] ("The overall structure this relationship points toward is a penumbra of
civil penalties around an inner core of fundamental moral precepts enforced by sanctions.");
John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 199 (1991) [hereinafter Coffee,
Unlawful] ("[T]he criminal law seems much closer to being used interchangeably with civil
remedies. Sometimes, identically phrased statutes are applicable to the same conduct--one
authorizing civil penalties, the other authorizing criminal sanctions. More often, the criminal
law is extended to reach behavior previously thought only civilly actionable." (footnote
omitted)); Id. at 201 ("The relationship of the civil and criminal law here is sequentially
interactive: the civil law experiments with a standard, but at some point it may 'harden' into
a community standard that the criminal law can enforce.").
221 Stephen Marks, Utility and Community: Musings on the Tort/Crime Distinction, 76
B.U. L. REV. 215, 233 (1996) (positing that tort law encompasses both prohibited and
conditionally permissible acts and that criminal law encompasses only prohibited acts, thus
implying that criminal law is a subset of tort law).
222 Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal.CivilDistinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. L.
REV. 201, 210 (1996) ("Civil law has taken on some characteristics of criminal law, such as its
increased use of punitive damages, but more commonly criminal law has been expanded to
include what were traditionally civil violations." (footnote omitted)).
223 Hart, supra note 186, at 404.
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is more limited in scope than civil liability, and criminal defendants
224
are afforded more procedural safeguards than civil defendants.
The possibility that criminal liability could be more expansive
than civil liability has been virtually ignored by the scholars,
although Gerald E. Lynch has, in passing, noted this anomaly in the
context of RICO:
There is a distinct oddity here, from the standpoint of
traditional distinctions between criminal and civil law:
Historically, we have expected the criminal law to be
narrower and more precise than the law of civil wrongs, but
in interpreting RICO, the courts have been distinctly more
comfortable with broad interpretations in criminal cases, and
25
correspondingly more hostile to civil applications.
This "distinct oddity" in the context of conduct sounding in
securities fraud suggests two initial conclusions about its causes
and effects.
First, the differing civil and criminal treatment arguably balances
two competing congressional concerns: appeasement of the public
and protection of big business. Criminal prosecution of corporate
executives for fraud permits injured shareholders to feel
vindicated. 226 At the same time, the unavailability of civil remedies
227
for this same conduct shields corporations from monetary losses.
Second, the anomalous civil and criminal treatment of conduct
sounding in securities fraud suggests that corporate defendants are
being overpunished and overdeterred or that civil securities
224 Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and Courts,
94 GEO. L.J. 1, 7-8 (2005) ("That the Framers of the Constitution and Bill of Rights
incorporated these protections indicates their belief that society holds a unique interest in
limiting the state's power to stigmatize and punish and, to this end, that criminal procedures
should guarantee protections transcending those offered to citizens subjected to civil suit or
regulation."); Hart, supra note 186, at 404 & n.12 (detailing the constitutional protections
afforded criminal defendants).
225 Lynch, supra note 185, at 29.
226 See Recine, supra note 7, at 1544-45 (compiling sources reporting public outrage and
widespread calls for criminal prosecution after the collapses of WorldCom and Enron); All
Things Considered:Hometown Residents React to Ebbers Verdict (NPR radio broadcast March
16, 2005),
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4537936
(reporting that many citizens of Bernard Ebbers' hometown, some of whom lost money
investing in WorldCom, welcomed his guilty verdict); Enron Verdicts Bring Closure To
Scandal's Victims (CBS
2
Chicago broadcast
May
25, 2006) available at
http://cbs2chicago.com/topstroies/Enron.Ken.Lay.2.328537.html
(reporting
that
former
employees who lost money in Enron stock felt happiness about the conviction of Enron
founder Ken Lay and former CEO Jeffrey Skilling).
227 S. REP. No. 104-98, at 9 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
679, 688
(characterizing securities fraud class actions as having "an in terrorem effect on Corporate
America").

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 72

plaintiffs are being under-compensated. As a companion to the
general assumption that criminal law is a subset of civil law,
scholars typically agree that the criminal law punishes and deters
and that the civil law compensates. 228 Ordinarily, therefore, if a
person's conduct is worthy of punishment and deterrence, the harm
caused by the conduct is civilly compensable. This relationship
between punishment/deterrence and compensation is skewed in the
securities context.
An examination of the reasoning underlying the leading theories
of the civil-criminal divide, however, demonstrates that the causes
and effects of the current scheme may be more nuanced than these
two initial conclusions suggest. In fact, the anomalous civil and
criminal treatment of conduct sounding in securities fraud is
arguably consistent with some of the reasoning underlying the
theories about the civil-criminal divide.
B. The Leading Theories About the Civil-CriminalDivide Shed
Light on the Anomalous Civil and Criminal Treatment of Conduct
Sounding in Securities Fraud.
The scholarship on the civil-criminal divide falls into two general
camps: those that use economics to explain the civil-criminal divide
229
and those that explain the divide with moral principles.
Undoubtedly, there is some overlap between the two camps. For
example, Professor Posner has noted that "on balance it would seem
that adherence to generally accepted moral principles increases the
wealth of society more than it reduces it,"230 and Alvin K. Klevorick
has argued that an economic view of society presupposes a
transaction structure formed by values. 231 This overlap does not,
228 Coffee, Unlawful, supra note 220, at 231 ("[Tort law and criminal law are
institutionally segregated so that one focuses principally on compensation and the other
principally on deterrence."); Lynch, supra note 185, at 27 ("The traditional rough distinction
between criminal and civil matters has been that criminal actions are brought by the
sovereign to punish and deter violations of social norms, while civil actions are brought by
private parties (or occasionally by the government in a proprietary or administrative capacity)
to compensate those who have suffered damage or to prevent harms from occurring.");
Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil
Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1808-09 (1992) (identifying the principal paradigmatic purpose of
the criminal law as punishment and of the civil law as compensation for damage caused).
229 See infra text accompanying notes 233-274.
230 POSNER, supra note 152, at 261 (questioning "But how inconsistent are morality and
efficiency?").
231 Alvin K. Klevorick, Legal Theory and the Economic Analysis of Torts and Crimes, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 905, 908 (1985) ("The law-and-economics explanation of the criminal sanction
But explaining a particular society's
presupposes the existence of a transaction structure ....
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however, prevent the two theories from being useful analytic tools.
Although the theories contain both normative and descriptive
components, 232 for purposes of this article, the theories will be
treated as descriptive. In other words, this article will examine
whether either theory can explain the anomaly-not whether the
anomaly is appropriate in light of either theory.
1. Economic Analysis of the Law Explains Some Components of the
Differing Civil and Criminal Treatment of Conduct Sounding in
Securities Fraud.
Economic analysis of the law purports to (1) identify what conduct
is limited through the civil and criminal laws, and (2) explain when
criminal liability is used, rather than civil liability, to limit that
conduct. Applied in the context of securities fraud, economic
analysis articulates why false statements to investors are limited by
civil and criminal laws and may explain why criminal liability is
broader than civil liability.
a. Economic Analysis Explains Why False Statements to Investors
Are Limited.
Economic analysis of the law recognizes that the civil and
criminal laws are used to achieve an optimal level of certain types of
undesirable behavior. There are two general economic explanations
of what behavior should be limited, both of which arguably apply to
false statements to investors.
First, some proponents of an economic analysis of the law
2 33
If
recognize that harm-causing behavior should be limited.
conduct causes harm, the civil and criminal laws are used to limit
that conduct to its optimal level, as determined through further
economic analysis. Under this view, false statements to investors
transaction structure requires an understanding of societal values-a conception of how a
society legitimates its transaction structure.").
232 POSNER, supra note 152, at 25 ("[P]rovided that efficiency is any sort of value in our
ethical system, two normative uses of economics mentioned earlier-to clarify value conflicts
and to point the way toward reaching given social ends by the most efficient path-are
untouched by the philosophical debate.").
233 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(a) (1962) (stating that one of "[tlhe general purposes of the
provisions governing the definition of offenses" is "to forbid and prevent conduct that
unjustifiable and inexcusably inflicts or threatens substantial harm to individual or public
interests"); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 172 (1968) ("Usually a belief that other members of society are harmed is the motivation
behind outlawing or otherwise restricting an activity.").
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are limited because they cause harm to investors.
Other proponents of an economic analysis of the law characterize
the conduct to be limited as the "bypassing of market
transactions. 234 In other words, if an actor coerces a transfer,
rather than engaging in a voluntary market exchange, the actor's
behavior should be limited to its optimal level by the civil and
criminal laws. As explained by Professor Posner, the victim of the
coercive transfer need not be the person with whom the market
transaction would have occurred:
The role of the criminal law in discouraging market
bypassing is obscured by the fact that the market transaction
that the criminal bypasses is usually not a transaction with
his victim. If someone steals my car, normally it is not
because he wants that car and would have bought it from me
if the criminal law had deterred him from stealing it. He
steals to get money to use in buying goods and services from
other people. The market transaction that he bypasses is the
exchange of his labor for money in a lawful occupation. But
235
it is still market bypassing.
False statements to investors are arguably a market bypass.
Individual perpetrators of securities fraud are generally motivated
by job security and compensation. 236 Rather than achieving these
goals through a market transaction-namely, by achieving
favorable results-the perpetrators bypass the market and make
false statements. It is irrelevant that the victims of the market
bypass-the investors-are not those with whom the market
transaction would have occurred. Under this view, false statements
to investors are limited because they bypass the markets.
b. Economic Analysis Arguably Explains the Anomalous Civil and
234 POSNER, supra note 152, at 208 ("These [intentional] torts and the corresponding list of
crimes involve not a conflict between legitimate (productive) activities but a coerced transfer
of wealth to the defendant in a setting of low transaction costs."); Posner, supra note 131, at
1195 ("The major function of criminal law in a capitalist society is to prevent people from
bypassing the system of voluntary, compensated exchange-the 'market,' explicit or implicitin situations where, because transaction costs are low, the market is a more efficient method
of allocating resources than forced exchange.").
235 Posner, supra note 131, at 1196 (emphasis omitted).
236 John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and
Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1562-63 (2006) ("[S]ecurities fraud appears to
be primarily motivated by the manager's own personal interests. Typically, managers hide
bad news because they fear loss of their jobs (either from a dismissal or a hostile takeover),
and they overstate favorable developments or inflate earnings in order to maximize the value
of their stock options and other equity compensation.").
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Criminal Treatment of Conduct Sounding in Securities Fraud.
Once the conduct to be limited is identified-either because it is
harm-causing or market-bypassing-an economic analysis of the
law determines how to limit the conduct to its optimal level, taking
into account the costs and benefits to the actor and to society. Civil
liability and criminal punishment are tools on a continuum to
achieve this optimal level.
Proponents of an economic analysis of the law agree that criminal
liability imposes a higher social cost than civil liability. 237 Unlike
imprisonment-which imposes a hefty cost on the offender but does
not compensate the victim-a transfer of money produces a gain to
the victim equal to the cost to the offender. 238 Moreover, society's
cost of imprisoning a person is far higher than the social cost of a
transfer of money from the offender to the victim. 2 39 Gary S. Becker
expressed the combination of these factors with the following
formula for the total social cost of punishment: f=bf (where f=social
cost of punishment; f=cost to offender of punishment; and
b=coefficient that transforms f unto f.2 40 Becker concluded that b
equals approximately zero for fines (and, by extension, for civil
24 1
liability), while b is greater than one for imprisonment.
Under an economic analysis of the law, therefore, criminal
liability is only optimal when the damages necessary to limit the
offender's conduct to an optimal level are higher than the actor
could pay.2 42 In order to act as a deterrent, the amount of damages,
237 POSNER, supra note 152, at 222, 227 (stating that tort remedies are less costly than
criminal fines and that criminal fines are less costly than imprisonment); Shavell, supra note
219, at 1235 ('The imposition of monetary sanctions will be assumed to involve lower social
costs than the imposition of nonmonetary sanctions.").
238 Becker, supra note 233, at 194 (recognizing that fines compensate victims, producing a
gain to victim equal to cost to offender); Shavell, supra note 219, at 1235 ("The motivation for
this assumption is that the disutility to parties who must make payments may be viewed as
roughly balanced by the addition to utility of parties who receive the payments or, where fines
are paid to the government, who find their tax burdens reduced. By contrast, the disutility
experienced by parties punished by nonmonetary sanctions is not balanced in any automatic
way by additions to the utility of other parties." (footnote omitted)).
239 Becker, supra note 233, at 194 ("Not only do other punishments fail to compensate, but
they also require 'victims' to spend additional resources in carrying out the punishment.");
Shavell, supra note 219, at 1235 ("Furthermore, the imposition of nonmonetary sanctions
often involves direct claims on goods and services, as with the building and operation of
prisons.").
240 Becker, supra note 233, at 180.
241

Id.

See id. at 181 (explaining that the goal is to determine a combination of the various
components of social cost that minimizes the total sum of social loss); Posner, supra note 131,
at 1201, 1203 (explaining that total social loss is a function of the following factors: the
242
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when multiplied by the probability of liability, must be higher than
the probability of success multiplied by the expected gain. 243 In
addition, the amount of monetary liability must be within the
defendant's ability to pay. 2"4 Once the ceiling of the actor's ability to
pay is surpassed, additional monetary liability does not increase the
level of deterrence and criminalization is necessary. 245
In the context of securities fraud, criminalization is arguably
necessary to achieve an optimal level of conduct. At first glance, the
imposition of criminal liability might appear to be unnecessary
because white collar defendants often possess the ability to pay
large sums of money. 246 The practical reality, however, is that
individual defendants seldom pay the damages imposed by civil
securities fraud liability. Rather, these costs fall largely on the
corporation and its insurer. 247 The expenses incurred by the
corporation are ultimately borne by its shareholders. 248 As a result,
the probability that an individual defendant would be required to
pay monetary damages for his conduct is so low that the amount of
potential damages required to achieve the optimal level of
deterrence is often beyond even the wealthiest defendant's reach.
The imposition of criminal liability for securities fraud is therefore
arguably explained by an economic analysis of the law.
In addition, an economic analysis of the law may explain why, in

benefit to the actor, the harm to society from the action, the probability of holding the actor
accountable, the cost of apprehending and holding the actor accountable, the cost to the actor
of accountability, and the cost to society of accountability).
243 Posner, supra note 131, at 1201-03 (explaining that the damages necessary to
discourage bypassing the market must make the actor more than indifferent to the bypass).
244 POSNER, supra note 152, at 222 ("[T]he optimal damages will often be very greatgreater, in many cases, than the tortfeasor's ability to pay.").
245 See id. ("Where tort remedies are an adequate deterrent because optimal tort damages,
including any punitive damages, are within the ability to pay of the potential defendant, there
is no need to invoke criminal penalties ... ").
246 Id. at 228 (questioning the justification for imprisoning defendants who could afford to
pay fines).
247 Coffee, supra note 236, at 1550 ("Although [corporate insiders] are regularly sued, they
rarely appear to contribute to the settlement. Rather, the corporate defendant and its insurer
typically advance the entire settlement amount.").
248 Id.
at 1536 ("[B]ecause the costs of securities class actions-both the settlement
payments and the litigation expenses of both sides-fall largely on the defendant corporation,
its shareholders ultimately bear these costs indirectly and often inequitably."); Anjan V.
Thakor, The Unintended Consequences of Securities Litigation, 8-9 (October 2005)
(unpublished research paper prepared for the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform),
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/issues/docload.cfm?docId=857
("[lin
securities
litigation, the compensatory payments represent a transfer payment from previously
'undamaged' shareholders-those who held on to their securities through the alleged fraud
period-to 'damaged' shareholders who acquired securities during the alleged fraud period.").
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the context of securities fraud, civil liability is more limited than
criminal liability. An assumption underlying an economic analysis
of the law, as detailed above, is that criminal liability imposes a
higher social cost than civil liability. 249 Under this assumption, it is
logical that criminal liability would be imposed for a smaller swathe
of conduct than civil liability. This assumption arguably does not
hold true, however, in the unique context of securities fraud.
Securities fraud lawsuits are unlike other civil lawsuits because the
total social cost of civil liability far exceeds the actual dollar amount
of the damages imposed.
The filing of a securities fraud lawsuit causes a steep drop in the
value of the sued company's shares, in excess of the dip caused by
the disclosure of the "truth" to the marketplace and the eventual
transfer of wealth from the defendants to the victims. 250 In other
words, the mere filing of the lawsuit causes equity to disappear; it is
not a "zero-sum game." 251 This excessive loss of shareholder equity
is attributable to financial distress costs (such as reduced access to
252
credit) and a diminished ability to conduct business.
In addition, the filing of a securities fraud lawsuit against one
company has spillover effects on the securities markets and the
overall economy.
Securities fraud class actions decrease stock
prices overall, 253 increase the costs of raising capital, 254 and chill
corporate disclosure. 255 Overall lower stock prices, in turn,
negatively affect capital investment, job creation, and business
expansion. 25 6 In addition, the threat of expansive civil liability may
See supra text accompanying notes 237-245.
Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743, 1763-64
(2005) (recognizing that the "market spillover" from civil securities fraud actions includes
severe drops in the value of the sued company's shares, generating "a threatening
overenforcement potential along a number of dimensions"); Thakor, supra note 248, at 5
("Thus, we can say that a lower bound estimate of the reduction in firm value solely due to
[securities] litigation, as distinct from the effect of the disclosure of bad news, is about 3.5
249
250

N%.,,).

Thakor, supra note 248, at 6.
Id. at 6-8.
253 Coffee, supra note 236, at 1537 ("[S]tock prices generally rise when legislation is passed
curtailing securities class actions.").
254 S. REP. No. 104-98, at 9 (1995), as reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 688 (finding that
securities fraud class actions "have added significantly to the cost of raising capital and
represent a 'litigation tax' on business").
255 S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (finding that securities fraud class actions "chill corporate
disclosure").
256 Id.
at 8 ("The Nation's capital markets play a critical role in our domestic economy by
creating jobs and expanding businesses."); Thakor, supra note 248, at 14 ("Given that
securities litigation lowers stock prices in and of itself, and lower stock prices induce firms to
plan for lower capital investments, one can conclude that a potentially pernicious effect of
251

252
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deter overseas companies from doing business in the United States
and "shift[] securities offerings away from domestic capital
257
markets."
Finally, civil securities fraud class actions, with their voluminous
pleadings
and complicated motions to dismiss, consume
considerable judicial resources, for which society foots the bill. 258 In
fact, Professor Coffee has raised the question of "whether society is
259
receiving an adequate return on its investment."
In light of the spillover costs of a civil securities fraud lawsuit,
above and beyond the mere transfer of a sum of money from the
defendant to the victims, the total social cost of civil liability may be
greater than the total social cost of criminal liability. Applying this
proposition to Professor Becker's formula discussed above, in which
b is the coefficient that transforms the cost of punishment to the
offender into the social cost of punishment, b is arguably greater for
civil liability than for criminal liability in securities cases. 260 In the
unique context of securities fraud, therefore, it is arguably
consistent with an economic analysis of the law for some conduct to
be criminally, but not civilly, actionable.
2. Moral Analysis Explains Some Components of the Anomalous
Civil and Criminal Treatment of Conduct Sounding in Securities
Fraud.
Moral theories of the civil-criminal divide purport to (1) identify
what conduct is classified as criminal and (2) articulate what goals
are furthered through the imposition of criminal punishment.
Applied in the context of securities fraud, moral analysis explains
why false statements to investors are limited by criminal laws and
highlights which goals are furthered, and which are hampered, by
the anomalous civil and criminal treatment of conduct sounding in
securities fraud.

such litigation is to cause a decline in corporate capital investment and growth, although the
precise magnitude of this is difficult to assess.").
257 Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 765 (2008).
258 Coffee, supra note 236, at 1540.
259

Id.

260

See supra text accompanying notes 240-41.
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a. Moral Analysis Explains Why False Statements to Investors Are
Limited by the CriminalLaws.
Under a moral theory of the civil-criminal divide, a crime is
different from a tort because it incurs "a formal and solemn
pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the community." 26 1 As
a result, only conduct that is morally repugnant should be classified
as a crime. 262 In other words, a crime is conduct for which society
values no social utility, while a tort is conduct for which the actor's
utility is acknowledged by society. 263 Although this formulation
uses the economic term "utility," it relies on "other disciplines,
including sociology, psychology, political science, philosophy,
theology, criminology, and jurisprudence" to determine what
activities have no societal value and should thus be designated as
crimes.264
Making false statements to investors arguably implicates moral
concerns to such a degree that it is worthy of criminal punishment
under a moral analysis of the law. Prohibitions on lying come from
sources as varied as the Ten Commandments 265 and Immanuel
Kant. 26 6 Kant states, "To be truthful (honest) in all declarations is,
261 Hart, supra note 186, at 405; see also Luna, supra note 191, at 713-14 ("When society
designates as 'crime' particular acts accompanied by a sufficient degree of subjective
awareness or intent, it makes a critical moral judgment about the wrongfulness of such
conduct, the resulting harm caused or threatened to others, and the culpability of the
perpetrators.").
262 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(c) (1962) (stating that one of "[t]he general purposes of the
provisions governing the definition of offenses" is "to safeguard conduct that is without fault
from condemnation as criminal"); Coffee, Unlawful, supra note 220, at 225 (the criminal law
"prefers to deal in moral absolutes"); Jerome Hall, Interrelationsof Criminal Law and Torts:
II, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 967, 996 (1943) ("[Moral culpability should remain the essence of
criminal liability .. "); Lynch, supra note 185, at 47 ("But if the dominant message of the
criminal law is a moral one, the criminal law must remain a moral enterprise."); Alan C.
Michaels, "Rationales"of Criminal Law Then and Now: For a Judgmental Descriptivism, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 54, 57 (2000) ("[T]he dominant view today sees an essential link between
punishment and moral wrongdoing.").
263 Coffee, Paradigms,supra note 220, at 1876 ("[C]riminal law should be reserved to
prohibiting conduct that society believes lacks any social utility, while civil penalties should
be used to deter (or 'price') many forms of misbehavior (for example, negligence) where the
regulated activity has positive social utility but is imposing externalities on others."); DauSchmidt, supra note 152, at 23 (stating that when a tort is committed, society values the
utility obtained from both sides of the incompatible preferences, but when a crime is
committed, "there is a significant disparity in the value society assigns to the utility derived
from each side of the incompatible preferences").
264 Dau-Schmidt, supra note 152, at 37.
265 Exodus 20:16 ("Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour.").
266 IMMANUEL KANT, On a Supposed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns, in
GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS WITH ON A SUPPOSED RIGHT TO LIE BECAUSE
OF PHILANTHROPIC CONCERNS 63, 63 (James W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 3d ed.
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therefore, a sacred and unconditionally commanding law of reason
26 7
that admits of no expediency whatsoever."
b. Moral Analysis May Explain the Anomalous Civil and Criminal
Treatment of Conduct Sounding in Securities Fraud.
Some theorists argue that criminal liability is reserved for a
subset of conduct-that which is truly morally repugnant-because
the imposition of criminal penalties is more costly to society than
the imposition of civil liability. 268 Arguably, if civil liability were
more costly to society than criminal liability, these theorists would
support the imposition of civil liability on a subset of immoral
conduct, leaving criminal liability for a wider swathe of conduct. As
discussed above, 26 9 in the unique context of securities fraud, civil
lawsuits may impose a higher social cost than criminal liability
because of the various spillover effects-including lower stock
prices, higher costs of raising capital, chilled corporate disclosure,
and consumption of judicial resources. This reasoning may explain
the breadth of criminal liability compared to the narrowness of civil
liability for conduct sounding in securities fraud.
c. Moral Analysis Explains What Goals Are Furtheredby the
Differing Civil and Criminal Treatment of Conduct Sounding in
Securities Fraud.
Several theories explain the imposition of liability for morally
repugnant conduct: corrective justice, retributive justice, and
compensatory justice. Traditionally, scholars discussed the goals of
liability separately in the contexts of tort and crime, but, as noted
by Gary T. Schwartz, parallel theories developed in each context,
permitting a merged analysis of the goals of tort and criminal
liability. 270
These theories support some components of the
Supp. 1993) (1785) (rejecting the proposition that there ever exists either the right or the duty
to be untruthful, even when asked by a murderer the whereabouts of his intended victim).
267 Id. at 65.
268 Coffee, Paradigms,supra note 220, at 1877 ("[T]he criminal law's scope must be limited
because society's capacity to focus censure and blame is among its scarcest resources."); DauSchmidt, supra note 152, at 35.
269 See supra text accompanying notes 246-60.
270 Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and
CorrectiveJustice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1801 (1997) (recognizing the "two major camps of tort
scholars" as embracing the tort goals of deterrence and corrective justice, and comparing them
to the two major camps of criminal scholars who embrace the goals of deterrence and
retribution); Id. at 1833-34 ("The discussions within criminal law scholarship of the goals of
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anomalous civil and criminal treatment of conduct sounding in
securities fraud.
Under a corrective justice theory, liability should have three
components: (1) imposition of liability for immoral behavior; 271 (2)
compensation of victims; and (3) financing of the compensation by
the responsible party. 2 72 Under the current scheme of civil and
criminal liability, only one of these elements is satisfied when an
actor lies to investors about objectively immaterial matters, makes
false forward-looking statements to investors, or aids and abets a
perpetrator of securities fraud. This conduct is punished criminally,
thus satisfying the first component, but is not civilly actionable,
thus failing to satisfy the second and third components. The
anomalous treatment of conduct sounding in securities fraud is not
consistent with a corrective theory of justice.
Retributive justice focuses on punishing a blameworthy individual
273
for immoral behavior, rather than on compensating the victims.
The imposition of criminal but not civil liability on corporate
executives for making false statements to investors or for aiding and
abetting securities fraud is consistent with the retributive theory of
justice because the executives are punished. The failure of the
victims to be compensated is irrelevant under this theory.
Finally, compensatory justice focuses-not on punishing the

deterrence and retributive justice in many ways parallel the debate among tort scholars as to
the goals of deterrence and corrective justice.").
271 Susan Randall, Corrective Justice and the Torts Process, 27 IND. L. REV. 1, 7 (1993)
(documenting that corrective justice theorists "posit a moral basis" for liability).
272 Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37
UCLA L. REV. 439, 449-50 (1990) ("These three components .... sanction defendants in
accordance with their moral responsibility and they compensate plaintiffs to the degree they
have been wrongfully injured, all in accordance with the demands of moral autonomy."); Gary
T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
313, 332 (1990) ("[T]he tort defendant, having created risks in a certain way, should serve as
the actual source of the compensation payment."); Richard W. Wright, Substantive Corrective
Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 625, 704 (1992) ('The party whose goods are adversely affected by
the behavior of another that is inconsistent with the parties' absolute moral equality has a
claim to rectification. The only person to whom such a claim can be directed is the other
party to the interaction, who caused the adverse effect through such behavior.").
273 Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated
Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313. 1317 (2000) ("Retribution, on
the other hand, assumes that the criminal should be hurt, and that the injury caused by the
criminal offense calls for a like infliction of injury on the criminal as a moral penalty."); David
Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1623, 1627 (1992) ("The notion
that the criminal's deserving punishment is sufficient to justify inflicting it on him is central
to most versions of retributivism, historical and contemporary."); Schwartz, supra note 272, at
326 ("Such an argument stipulates that a defendant, because he has acted in a certain
improper way, should be required to bear the burden of liability for the resulting harm.").
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defendant-but on compensating the victims. 274 Under this theory,
it is not necessary that the morally responsible actor compensate
the victims, so long as the victims are compensated by someone. In
the context of securities fraud, this theory does not explain why
certain immoral conduct would be punished criminally but not
civilly. When the conduct is punished only criminally, the victims
are not compensated.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, substantive and procedural differences between
criminal and civil treatment of conduct sounding in securities fraud
cause criminal liability to exceed the scope of private civil liability.
The potential repercussions of this anomaly are far-reaching,
including chilling corporate disclosure, creating a class of
reasonable investors who make investment decisions on the basis of
vague statements of corporate optimism, transferring enforcement
responsibility away from the SEC to the DOJ and the individual
states, discouraging professionals from advising emerging
companies, affording prosecutors undue discretion in deciding what
conduct to prosecute, coercing defendants into agreeing to
unfavorable settlements with the SEC, and leaving injured
investors without compensation.
The rationales underlying the theories about the civil-criminal
divide explain some components of the anomalous criminal and civil
treatment of conduct sounding in securities fraud.
Under an
economic analysis of the law, the immense social cost imposed by
civil liability-arguably exceeding the social cost imposed by
criminal liability-may explain why civil liability is more limited
than criminal liability in this unique context. Under a moral view
of the civil-criminal divide, the imposition of criminal liability, even
without companion civil liability, satisfies the goal shared by
corrective and retributive justice theories of holding the morally
responsible actor liable. The absence of civil liability for some
conduct that violates moral lines, however, is contrary to the goal
shared by corrective and compensatory justice theories of
compensating the victims.

274 Schwartz, supra note 272, at 328 ("The essence of such an argument is that the
defendant-having been involved in a certain way in the infliction of the plaintiffs injury-is
under an obligation to make sure that the plaintiff receives compensation for that injury."
(footnote omitted)).
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Therefore, this article proposes a two-step solution. First, in light
of the far-reaching effects of the anomalous civil and criminal
treatment of conduct sounding in securities fraud and the failure of
the theories about the civil-criminal divide to explain the anomaly
fully, Congress should reign in the scope of criminal liability to the
current reach of civil liability by curtailing the use of the wire/mail
fraud run-around, expanding the safe harbor for forward-looking
statements to criminal actions, imposing stricter pleading standards
for criminal indictments, and preempting broad state criminal laws.
Second, because the more expansive reach of criminal liability
than civil liability is arguably consistent with many of the theories
underlying the civil-criminal divide, Congress should consider
carefully whether to expand the reach of criminal liability-while
recognizing and compensating for the impacts of that expansion on
the current scheme of securities regulation.
For example, if
Congress makes the deliberate decision to lower the materiality
standard for criminal securities fraud, Congress should compensate
for the chilling effect on voluntary disclosure by making more
disclosures mandatory. Only by proceeding in a deliberate fashion
can Congress simultaneously further the rationales underlying the
civil-criminal divide and prevent the distortion of the carefully
balanced scheme of securities regulation.

